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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The objectives of this report are to summarize and critically discuss the analytical 
underpinnings of institution-centered Strategic Environmental Assessment (I-SEA), and to 
provide an analytical framework for evaluation of pilot I-SEAs conducted in a World Bank 
program in several developing countries. The analysis mainly focuses on the policy level, but 
findings are also expected to be of relevance for SEA at the plan and program level.  
As outlined in World Bank (2005) and Ahmed and Sánchez-Triana (2008)
7
, the principal 
objective of I-SEA is to integrate key environmental issues in (sector) policy formulation and 
implementation. In order to successfully integrate key environmental issues in policies, the 
World Bank assumes that it is vital to put a particular focus on the role of institutions while 
performing an SEA.  
This report is structured in three parts. In part A of the report a conceptual model of I-SEA is 
outlined comprising six steps:  
 The first step calls for understanding formation and formulation of policies for a certain 
sector or theme in a specific country or region. It is assumed that policy formation takes 
place along a continuum without start or an end. Policy formulation may take place as a 
discrete (time bounded) intervention along the policy formation continuum. Arguably, 
policy formulation offers a rare opportunity to incur specific influence on a policy. 
Consequently, I-SEA aims at incorporating environmental concerns during this “window 
of opportunity”.  
 The creation of a dialogue is the second step of the I-SEA approach. It aims at bringing all 
relevant stakeholders together in a discussion on the environmental issues relevant to the 
proposed policy.  
 To inform this dialogue, the third step is the identification of key environmental issues 
facilitated by a situation analysis and a stakeholder analysis. The stakeholder analysis 
should inform the identification of the legitimate stakeholders to the key environmental 
issues in the sector identified through the situation analysis. 
 The fourth step calls for environmental priority setting, which implies that the legitimate 
stakeholders are invited to react to the situation analysis, raise specific and relevant 
environmental priority concerns and choose the I-SEA priorities.  
 Institutional analysis of the strengths and weaknesses, constraints and opportunities to 
address these environmental priorities is the kernel of the fifth I-SEA step.  
 Finally, in the sixth step adjustments to the proposed policy and the underlying 
institutional conditions are suggested and recommended.  
                                            
7
 World Bank, 2005. Integrating Environmental Considerations in Policy Formulation: Lessons from Policy-
Based SEA Experience. Report 32783, Washington, DC; Ahmed, Kulsum and Ernesto Sánchez-Triana (Ed.), 
2008, Strategic Environmental Assessment for Policies – An Instrument for Good Governance, Washington DC. 
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Part B of the report covers strands of research literature that are relevant to the I-SEA steps 
outlined above: 
On understanding policy processes the report presents various metaphors of policy processes, 
e.g. policy making as rational linear planning, a cyclic process, networking; and policy 
making as action-flow, respectively. It is critical to adjust the I-SEA approach to the 
particular policy process it is trying to influence. I-SEA can facilitate the solution to complex 
societal problems through organizing interaction and dialogue between stakeholders and by 
bringing a greater variety of perspectives into the policy process.  
On identifying environmental priorities the report presents perspectives on environmental 
priority setting, and emphasizes the need to understand that environmental priorities are a 
sub-set of a larger set of other (political, social, economic etc.) priorities in society, and must 
be identified in relation to them. A key message in this section is that priority setting should 
not be the exclusive domain of experts, nor of public opinion, but rather of both. The report 
emphasizes the need for an I-SEA team to address key questions like: what are the political 
economy aspects related to environmental priority setting? Who sets the priorities for 
environmental management? Who sets the environmental agenda? 
Strengthening stakeholder representation is presented as a key component of integration of 
environmental and social concerns in policy formulation.  Variety in stakes and preferences 
in society, and complex policy processes, require that many contrasting stakes and views are 
represented in planning and decision-making as well as in implementation. Of particular 
importance is the need to promote and ensure representation of weak and marginalized 
groups in society in policy formulation processes. At a general level this is promoted by 
strengthening social constituencies and institutions for good governance and transparency.  
Specifically, I-SEA can facilitate strengthened stakeholder representation by ensuring broad 
and multiple stakeholder involvement in planning and implementation of policies.  
Conducting institution-centered SEA also requires analyzing institutional capacities and 
constraints, as well as measures to strengthen institutions‟ capacity to integrate environment 
in policy planning and implementation. Following North (1994)
8
, institutions may be made 
up of formal constraints (e.g., rules, laws, constitutions) and informal constraints (e.g., norms 
of behaviour, conventions, codes of conduct); they are slow to change, distinct from 
organizations and influenced by social capital such as trust, shared values and religious 
beliefs. Key institutional features to be assessed are the ability of institutions to pick up 
signals about social and environmental issues, to give citizens a voice, to foster social 
learning and public responsiveness, to balance competing interests by negotiating change and 
forging agreements, and to execute and implement solutions by credibly following through 
on agreements. In order to ensure integration of environment in policy formulation, it is 
argued that SEA needs to identify and understand the role of key institutions, and assess 
needs and possibilities for institutional strengthening and change.  
                                            
8
 North, Douglas. C., 1994. Economic Performance Through Time, The American Economic Review, Vol.  84, 
p. 359-368. 
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Strengthening social accountability includes ensuring public participation in policy 
formulation and promoting voice and rights to access to information and justice (especially 
among weak and vulnerable groups), and social inclusion in key planning and decision-
making fora. Key to strengthening social accountability in general, and in I-SEA in 
particular, is the need to create iterative processes (between the state and the public) in which 
implementation is assessed by the public in order to ensure accountability of the state vis-à-
vis society and its stakeholders, and facilitate adaptive planning, which is sensitive to the 
preferences and needs of the public.  
Ensuring social learning presupposes that the state and the public bureaucracy learn from 
experiences and modify present actions on basis of the results of previous actions. It is 
emphasized that social learning is a subset of learning which also includes e.g. technical, 
conceptual and political learning. Social learning builds on both technical and conceptual 
learning but focuses on interaction and communication among actors. In ensuring social 
learning in the integration of environment in policies it is necessary to understand and utilize 
(the role of) research and science-based evidence. In promoting social learning an I-SEA 
should: (i)  “politicize” environmental issues, by linking them to broader development issues 
and integrating agendas of environmental ministries with those of more influential ministries; 
(ii) strengthen policy advocacy networks and creating public forums for policy debate to 
ensure that diverse perspectives are repeatedly placed on policy makers‟ agendas; and (iii) 
put effective transparency mechanisms in place and support media scrutiny of policy 
formulation and implementation (Ahmed and Sanchez-Triana, 2008). 
Based on this conceptual analysis, a framework for evaluating I-SEA pilots is also proposed 
as part C of this report. This framework aims at: i) establishing joint objectives and a joint 
methodology for the pilot evaluations; ii) forming a shared understanding of the objectives, 
concepts and methodologies used in institution-centered SEA; and iii) facilitating the cross 
analysis of the results of the different pilot evaluations. It proposes a specific evaluation 
methodology, comprising objectives, process steps, evaluation questions and report narrative.  
Instead of providing a benchmark to assess success or failure of specific I-SEA cases or 
experiences, the purpose of the evaluation framework is to assist the evaluators in studying 
concrete attempts to influence policy for environmental sustainability. Ultimately, the 
objective is learning from the cases in order to enrich the I-SEA framework and improve the 
integration of environment in policy formation. The value of this report therefore depends on 
its effectiveness to convey clear guidance for the evaluators to achieve this learning objective 
through an analysis as comprehensive and objective as possible. 
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A. INSTITUTION-CENTERED SEA 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) originated as an extension of project level 
environmental impact assessments (EIA) to the plan, program and policy level. Many of the 
SEAs being conducted today are still largely focused on assessing impacts and based on EIA-
type methodologies. Limitations to using this approach, especially at the policy level, have 
however been identified and focus of much debate (Ahmed and Sánchez-Triana, 2008; 
Fischer 2007; Partidario, 2000). A range of alternative approaches have been proposed and 
used, and there is an ongoing debate among scholars about their respective limitations and 
merits. For example Partidario (2000) distinguishes between a “decision-centred model of 
SEA” and an EIA-based SEA model, and Fischer (2007) distinguishes between 
“administration-led SEA” and “cabinet SEA”.  
Based on experiences with integrating environmental considerations in development policy, 
the World Bank has put forward an institution-centered approach to SEA (I-SEA) (World 
Bank, 2005; Ahmed and Sánchez-Triana, 2008). Initiating analytical as well as practical 
work on I-SEA stems mainly from two sources: it is a response to the World Bank‟s 
broadening of lending focus from projects to development policy loans (World Bank, 2004) 
and to its Environment Strategy mandate to focus work on strategic environmental 
assessment (World Bank, 2001). It also stems from OECD‟s Guidance on SEA in 
development cooperation (OECD, 2006), which suggests I-SEA as an approach for assessing 
the complex interactions between political, social and environmental factors in policies. 
Central to the I-SEA approach is that in order for SEA to be effective at the policy level, it 
should be centered on assessing institutions and governance systems that underlie 
environmental and social management rather than on predicting impacts of alternative policy 
actions. However, in line with the OECD DAC SEA Guidance, it is recognized that 
approaches to conduct SEA are varied, and lie on a continuum. While at the policy level a 
particular focus on institutions may generally be an appropriate SEA approach, in other 
circumstances more impact oriented SEA approaches may be appropriate.  
Acknowledging the tentative nature of I-SEA as well as the limitations of traditional SEA 
approaches, the World Bank has launched a pilot program on I-SEA. The main objective of 
this program has been twofold: i) to support mainstreaming of environmental and social 
considerations in the Bank‟s activities supporting policies and sector reform and, ii) to test 
and validate the I-SEA approach in different sectors, countries and regions. Ultimately, the 
pilot program seeks to draw broader lessons on the effectiveness of I-SEA and to yield tools 
that could be useful in applying this approach. The pilot program comprises two components. 
One component provides grants and specialized assistance to support SEA pilots linked to 
Bank‟s activities such as development policy loans, technical assistance lending, adaptable 
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program loans, etc. The other component is the evaluation of the pilots to draw lessons on 
approaches, methods and processes for effective institution-centered SEA. 
Scope: The conceptual analysis and evaluation framework outlined in this report is part of 
the broader World Bank pilot program on I-SEA. The World Bank coordinates the evaluation 
of the SEA pilot program with the Environmental Economics Unit at the Department of 
Economics of the Gothenburg University (EEU), the Swedish EIA Centre at the Swedish 
University of Agricultural Sciences, and the Netherlands Commission for Environmental 
Assessment (NCEA). The report has been developed in a process based on collaborative 
work among the authors, and has been subject to peer review by the programme partners 
outlined above and external resource persons. The peer review has been facilitated by 
discussions in workshops held in Rotterdam (Sept. 8, 2008) and Gothenburg, Sweden (Oct. 
27-28, 2008), respectively.  
This conceptual analysis and evaluation framework will guide the evaluation of the I-SEA 
pilots. In order to optimize the dissemination of the evaluation‟s results to a broader 
audience, a steering committee of international resource persons and practitioners (e.g. from 
the development and SEA community, developing country partners etc.) would be 
established. This committee would provide feedback on the evaluation design and the draft 
report and assist the evaluation team in the dissemination of the evaluation results. 
Objectives: This report has the following objectives: i) to summarize and critically discuss 
the analytical underpinnings of institution-centered SEA; ii) to provide an analytical 
framework for the evaluation of the pilot SEAs of the World Bank program on institutions 
centred-SEA.  
The analysis mainly focuses on the policy level, but findings are expected to be of relevance 
for SEA at the plan and program level as well. The report does not intend to cover all issues 
pertaining to the broad subject of SEA and institutions. Rather it covers strands of research 
literature relevant to institution-centered SEA and issues relevant to guide the evaluation of 
the pilot I-SEAs.   
Report structure: The report is structured in three parts. In part A of the report a conceptual 
model of I-SEA comprising six steps is outlined. Part B of the report contains a conceptual 
analysis of the issues and aspects relevant to the I-SEA steps outlined in Part A. The 
following issues are analyzed:  policy processes, environmental priority setting, stakeholder 
representation, institutional capacities and constraints, social accountability, and social 
learning. Perspectives of each issue as well as links to SEA are presented and discussed. The 
framework for evaluating I-SEA pilots constitutes Part C of the report.  
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2. INSTITUTION-CENTERED SEA – A CONCEPTUAL 
MODEL 
Integrating the environment in strategic planning and decision-making implies that key 
environmental issues are taken up in formation of policies in general and in policy 
formulation in particular. Arguably, formulation of a new policy implies a window of 
opportunity over a specific time period during which key environmental issues and concerns 
have extra-ordinary possibilities to be addressed and considered. Once a policy is formally 
adopted the possibilities to integrate environmental concerns are considerably smaller 
(Cohen, March and Olson, 1972; Kingdon, 1995).  
In order to successfully integrate key environmental issues in policies, the World Bank 
(2005) suggests that it is vital to focus on the role of institutions while performing an SEA. In 
addition, some other key issues also warrant specific focus to ensure environmentally and to 
some extent socially sustainable outcomes. These issues include understanding the policy 
process, identifying environmental priorities, strengthening stakeholder representation, 
analyzing and strengthening institutional capacities, analyzing and mitigating institutional 
constraints, strengthening social accountability, and ensuring social learning. In order to be 
effective, the actual application of I-SEA for a certain (sector) policy needs to be adjusted to 
the location-specific context. 
The World Bank‟s approach to assess and strengthen institutions in integrating environment 
in policies –planning as well as implementation – builds on 6 steps:  
1. Understanding policy formation and potential windows of opportunity for 
influencing decision making: The first step calls for analysing and understanding formation 
as well as formulation of policies for a certain sector or theme in a specific country or region. 
As illustrated in Figure 1 it is assumed that policy formation takes place along a continuum 
without a start or an end. However, policy formulation may take place as a discrete (time 
bounded) intervention along the policy formation continuum. Such an intervention is an act 
of power, which may be associated with a policy paper that justifies that act. An act of power 
can also be a public announcement about the way power will be used in the future (e.g. 
giving permits, allocation of property rights, environmental entitlements etc.). The time 
period in which policy formulation takes place implies a rare opportunity to incur specific 
and arguably additional influence on a policy compared to other times along the policy 
formation continuum. Hence, I-SEA has as its goal to incorporate environmental concerns in 
policy formation in general, and focuses its attention on influencing the policy formulation 
process in particular. 
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Figure 1. Schematic Representation of I-SEA in Policy Formation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank, 2008  
2. Initiation of stakeholder dialogue: The second step in the I-SEA approach calls for 
creation of a dialogue. The dialogue aims at bringing all relevant stakeholders together in a 
discussion on the environmental issues relevant to the proposed policy. “Relevant 
stakeholders” implies actors in society which claim a stake in the policy, its implementation 
and the associated environmental issues. The dialogue may be facilitated and coordinated by 
a (formal/informal) inter-sectoral SEA steering committee. The ultimate objective of the 
dialogue is to seize the opportunity to incorporate environmental considerations in the 
continuum of policy formation created by the commitment to formulate a new or reform an 
existing policy (a discrete policy intervention).  
3. Identification of key environmental issues: The third step calls for identification of the 
key environmental issues upon which the dialogue, assessment and I-SEA recommendations 
will be focused. The identification builds on two components: a situation analysis and a 
stakeholder analysis. The purpose of the situation analysis is to identify the key 
environmental issues relevant to the sector or policy process under consideration. Rather than 
assessing the potential impacts of the proposed policy or plan, the situation analysis focuses 
on identifying the key environmental issues currently affecting the sector or region that will 
be influenced by the proposed discrete intervention. The key question guiding the situation 
analysis is: what are the existing key environmental issues affecting the sector or region?  
Likewise, the aim of the stakeholder analysis is the identification of the legitimate 
stakeholders to these key environmental issues in the sector or policy process. The I-SEA 
Policy 
Formation 
Discrete Policy 
Intervention 
I-SEA entry point is the opportunity to integrate environmental 
considerations in discrete (time bounded) policy interventions 
The purpose of I-SEA is to integrate environmental 
considerations in the continuous policy formation 
Learning 
(feedback) 
Learning 
(feedback) 
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model assumes that it is critical for environmental sustainability that these voices be 
identified and heard during policy formation and planning. It requires therefore that the 
following questions are addressed: Who are the legitimate stakeholders (“are those claiming 
stakes jointly perceived as legitimate stakeholders?”), and what are their interests and 
motivation? 
4. Environmental priority setting: The fourth step calls for identification and selection of 
environmental priorities. This implies that the legitimate stakeholders are invited to react to 
the situation analysis and have a leading role in the final environmental priority setting, 
raising in the process their environmental priority concerns. This is a critical stage of I-SEA 
because, on the one hand, it attempts to promote a process by which social and 
environmental preferences are brought into the policy dialogue aiming at influencing policy 
and planning formulation and implementation. On the other hand, it also attempts to facilitate 
or assist in the creation or strengthening of constituencies with an environmental stake in the 
policy process. Following recent thinking on political science (e.g. Blair, 2008), the I-SEA 
model assumes that a critical force for integrating environmental considerations in the 
continuum of policy formation are groups organized around a common environmental 
interest or concern directly or indirectly affected by the policy process. Without strengthened 
and effective environmental constituencies, therefore, the I-SEA model assumes that 
environmental mainstreaming in policy making would be short-lived. Laws, presidential 
decrees or regulations eventually adopted when policies are formulated risk to be partially 
applied, reverted, distorted or even ignored during policy implementation.    
5. Institutional assessment: The fifth step calls for an institutional analysis of strengths and 
weaknesses, constraints and opportunities to address the key environmental issues and 
priorities identified in the fourth step. The scope of the institutional assessment covers sector 
and environmental organizations that are responsible for the formulation and implementation 
of the policy under consideration. It also covers the prevailing formal and informal rules that 
shape conditions affecting or constraining the behaviour of social actors affected by the 
policy such as property and customary rights, checks and balance mechanisms for decision 
making, access to information and justice, etc. Important questions to address in this part of 
the I-SEA approach are: How do existing systems, organisations and institutions in the 
country, region or sector manage the environmental priorities identified by the I-SEA? Is 
there adequate capacity to identify and address environmental priorities? Are there 
underlying rules that constrain or reinforce the effective implementation of the policy 
changes under consideration?     
6. Formulation of policy and institution adjustments: Lastly, in the sixth step adjustments 
to the proposed policy and the underlying institutional conditions affecting the formulation 
and implementation of the policy are suggested and recommended.  The adjustments aim at 
complementing the policy under consideration to promote or improve environmental 
mainstreaming and at addressing institutional gaps i.e. making appropriate adjustments based 
on the strengths and weaknesses, constraints and opportunities of the existing institutions. 
Proposed adjustments are taken back to the stakeholders for review and assessment in a 
validation analysis.  
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As outlined in Figure 2, the World Bank‟s model assumes that by following the six steps 
discussed above the possibilities to achieve the objective of integrating environmental 
considerations in policy formulation and implementation could be greatly enhanced. 
Important process outcomes of the I-SEA approach are assumed to be i) raised attention to 
environmental priorities; ii) strengthened environmental constituencies; iii) enhanced 
accountability mechanisms for policy implementation, and iv) greater ability for social 
learning. Admittedly, however, contextual factors would influence goal achievement.  
Figure 2. Conceptual Model of I-SEA: Process Steps, Process Outcomes and Objectives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: authors 
 
 
Although the steps outlined above are suggested to be included in practical applications of I-
SEA there is no blueprint for how each step should be undertaken. Conducting I-SEA implies 
an ability to take advantage of windows of opportunity for influencing policy, flexibility to 
adapt to circumstances beyond the control of the I-SEA team and a great dose of common 
sense. The I-SEA approach is a theoretical construction based on a dearth of practical 
experience. The validity of this model needs empirical testing and evaluation. That is the 
purpose of the World Bank‟s I-SEA pilot programme based on the methodological 
framework for evaluating the I-SEA pilots outlined in this document. 
Six steps of I-SEA: 
1. Understanding policy formation and 
windows of opportunity to  influence decision 
making  
2.Initiation of stakeholder dialogue 
3.Identification of key environmental issues: 
 a. Situation analysis 
 b. Stakeholder analysis 
4.Environmental priority setting 
5.Institutional assessment 
6.Formulation of  policy and  institution 
adjustments 
a. Validation analysis 
 
I-SEA Objective: 
Integration of key environmental issues in 
(sector) policy formulation and 
implementation, in order to enhance 
environmental sustainability. 
Process Outcomes of I-SEA: 
i) raised attention to environmental 
priorities 
ii) strengthened constituencies  
iii) improved social accountability  
iv) greater ability for social learning 
 
Contextual influencing factors:  
 i) historical, political, social, economic, and cultural  
ii) political economy of reform 
iii) windows of opportunity for policy influence and 
institutional reform  
iv) luck    
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B. KEY ISSUES IN I-SEA 
This part of the report elaborates on issues of key importance in I-SEA, including some of 
the steps and process outcomes outlined in the conceptual model of I-SEA (figure 2). 
Different perspectives on each key issue are presented before factors to be taken into account 
when doing an I-SEA are discussed. 
 
3. UNDERSTANDING POLICY PROCESSES 
An important prerequisite for influencing policies through I-SEA is to understand policy 
formation and adjust the I-SEA approach to the particular policy process it is trying to 
influence. This section discusses critical aspects of policy processes and outlines key factors 
that need to be taken into account when trying to influence policy formation through an I-
SEA. 
 
3.1 Perspectives on Policy Processes 
A policy may be defined as a course of action, based on some declared and respected 
principle or set of principles. Public policies can be defined as the use of state power to 
change organizational or individual behaviour in order to effectuate their national 
responsibilities and objectives (see Hill, 2005 for a discussion of various definitions). 
However, policy making is multi-faceted and subject to considerable debate and analysis. 
Partly contesting perceptions and definitions are suggested to explain what policy making is, 
and how policy changes can be explained (Hill, 2005). So instead of one comprehensive and 
exclusive description, policy making is currently best explained in terms of metaphors. 
Key metaphors of policy making include (i) policy making as rational linear planning; (ii) 
policy making as a cyclic process; (iii) policy making as networking; and (iv) policy-making 
as action-flow: 
(i) Policy making as rational planning, describes policy planning in terms of a “linear 
model” with certain “stages”, like problem definition, policy formulation, decision-
making, and implementation. Many impact assessment manuals are structured according 
to the rational planning perspective.  
(ii) Policy making as a cyclic process: a policy paper is prepared, implemented, evaluated 
and updated. This is closely related to the political process, where the elected 
government leaders answer to parliament. The need to periodically evaluate and review 
policy papers may be required by law; 
(iii) Policy making as networking postulates that decisions about the use of resources emerge 
in multi-actor policy networks (e.g. Kickert e.a. 1997) at multiple levels and scales;  
(iv) Policy-making as action-flow: social streams of problem owners (complainers), 
proponents of solution (builders) and political parties (selectors) which, if they coincide, 
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form windows of opportunity for policy entrepreneurs (e.g. Kingdon 1984, 1995). In a 
way, problems, possible solutions and parties find themselves in a “garbage can” from 
which real solutions may or may not emerge (Cohen, March and Olson 1972). Although 
governments cannot fully control policy processes they can play an important role in 
them by stimulating the emergence of windows of opportunity for the social streams of 
actors to interact and find solutions. Facilitating factors for this to happen include skills 
of social learning and building of trust (e.g. Nooteboom, 2006). 
The ambiguity of policy processes: Complex policy processes may be ambiguous, largely 
because of contradictions between existing legislation and political aspirations and objectives 
(Ritter and Webber 1973; Schön and Rhein 1994). Clearly, uncertainties and risk also create 
(or aggravate existing) ambiguities. Moreover, conflicts between short-term and long-term 
objectives tend to introduce ambiguities in the policy process, as well as trade-offs between 
incompatible objectives (such as hydro-power investments and sustained ecosystem 
functions in a watershed). Ambiguities may also occur as a result of different lock-ins. Such 
lock-ins may be of institutional character (power relations, vested interests) or of physical 
character (e.g. energy systems which cannot be easily changed within the short term).  Such 
lock-ins constrain the range of opportunities and introduce ambiguities between political 
objectives (e.g. ecologically sustainable energy production) and practices (ecologically 
unsustainable energy production) (Beck 1992).  
Tension caused by ambiguities in the policy making process may have profound 
repercussions on the possibility to pursue some sort of rational policy planning and use 
technical analytical tools for priority setting. Ambiguities have to be identified and sorted 
out, usually in a process of intensified stakeholder participation and a focus on social issues 
(preferences, constraints, opportunities) rather than technical issues only (e.g. Feldman and 
Khademian 2008; Kornov and Thissen 2000).  
The risk of a technocratic approach: The metaphors above are not necessarily inconsistent 
with each other; in fact they symbolize different aspects of policy processes. However, it is 
important to understand that the nature of complex policy processes depends deeply on how 
the system reacts to the limited understanding of individual policy makers (cf. Herbert 
Simon‟s (1957; 1991) bounded rationality). Policy makers may either be primarily led by 
limited one-sided understanding (or rationality), or acknowledging the complexities of policy 
making and try to merge their own knowledge with that of others (policy making as “battle of 
ideas”). The former approach to policy making may be dominated by conflict in the networks 
and garbage cans layer of policy processes, while the latter may be more dominated by 
cooperation.  
The first would often be referred to as a technocratic approach, which interprets policy 
making only as rational linear or circular planning, failing to acknowledge that complex 
policy making implies many actors in networks and that policies are formed in a flow of 
actions, which can not be anticipated in pre-planned sequences. A technocratic approach 
focusing on the production of a policy paper may thus be a misguided effort if it is 
disconnected with the realities of real planning and practice in a sector or subject-matter area. 
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As indicated by Gould (2005), an overly technocratic approach to policy making may lead to 
two “disjunctures”: between policy formulation and policy implementation, and between 
policy and politics, respectively. In addition to relatively useless “paper tigers” it may also 
lead to policy proposals that are not politically accepted. Many scholars underline the 
importance of policy formation that is sensitive to social realities and complexities and argue 
for an understanding of policy formation as occurring in networks of interdependent actors, 
which all exercise influence at various degrees, and that it is a continuous process without 
beginning or end (e.g. Feldman and Khademian, 2008; Kickert e.a  1997). 
Policy processes, power and knowledge:  Descriptions of policy making as networking 
typically also address the role and influence of power and knowledge on the policy making 
process. Here, power and knowledge are purported to be held by many (rather than few) 
actors, although the influence may vary considerably across the actors. Individual actors are 
tied in a larger web of actors, who relates to a complex society. This implies that individuals 
(e.g. leaders representing an elite) who are trying to influence the agenda are constrained by 
other powers held in the wider system of (local, national and international) actors and 
institutions. Nobody is really fully in charge of the system, i.e. of sectoral development. This 
description represents a stark contrast to other descriptions of policy making as a rational 
issue determined by a select group of influential actors (typically “decision-makers and 
experts”) interacting in a well-structured society of tangible institutions. Hence, in most 
countries, power is shared in networks of actors (e.g. Lindquist 2001; Kickert et al., 1997), 
which may cut across the formal structure of ministries, agencies and other government 
organisations. One way of describing how policies emerge is therefore the existence of a web 
of small decisions emanating from the actors, which add up to larger decisions on policy 
formulation. Therefore, steps to resolve policy issues (formulated in political goals) are often 
incremental (Lindblom, 1959).  
Whether influence can be exercised depends on the perceived benefits among the key 
influential actors in the political process; it helps if interests are organized and alliances 
(advocacy coalitions) are established based on these interests (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 
1993). In developing countries such advocacy coalitions typically consist of a mix of 
international and national organizations. The policy process becomes a “battle of discourses”, 
in which arguments are sought to support positions already taken.  
The incremental steps of policy formation are also parts of a social learning process, which 
may lead to a state of balance between (organized) interests (“countervailing powers”). 
Through social learning, subjects become aware that balance is needed to prevent one interest 
dominating over the other, preventing change. These public organizations and associated 
institutions (for example the sharing of power in a democratic system among judicial, 
legislature and executive bodies, but also between planning authorities and implementing 
authorities), cannot be changed overnight, but incremental actions may add up to significant 
and sometimes sudden changes.  
Implementation of policies:  Arguably, policies are often poorly implemented (Pressman 
and Wildawsky, 1973); official government policies create higher political expectations than 
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can be met in practice. A large set of reasons may explain this. Besides lack of commitment 
and resources among actors, responsible for development and implementation of public 
policies, often lack sufficient knowledge on the local conditions in which the policy is to be 
implemented. The existing incentive structure may also be biased towards rewarding 
opportunistic (overly ambitious) policies rather than realistic policies. Realistic policies may 
look less ambitious and include fewer promises, and in democratic systems such policies may 
not be rewarded in re-elections. Causes behind failed implementation are not only found in 
the political system. They are also found in the inertia in actors‟ beliefs and preferences, in 
society‟s institutions and in the realities on the ground, e.g. the functioning and structure of 
the local markets (e.g. Lipsky, 1980). A significant challenge is therefore to find levers that 
actually can influence these beliefs and preferences, strengthen institutions and meet the 
demands and realities on the ground.  
Enabling Leadership: Theories about complexity and leadership indicate that new forms of 
enabling leadership may emerge under complex conditions. Politicians who position 
themselves “above the battle of discourses”, and can reconcile social dilemmas (as the battle 
between discourses expresses) display enabling leadership (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007). Enabling 
leaders stimulate interaction and dialogue among many groups in order to identify a larger 
variety of possibilities. They are in fact increasing the number and variety of actors and ideas 
in the policy process, which is a requisite for adaptability to changing conditions (Ashby, 
1956; Uhl-Bien et al 2007). Practical methods have been developed to achieve variety in 
policy processes, of which joint fact finding, process management are a few (e.g. De Bruin et 
al., 1998; Susskind et al., 2001). 
 
3.2 SEA and Policy Processes 
In general, the World Bank I-SEA approach (World Bank, 2005; Ahmed and Sánchez-
Triana, 2008), and Feldman and Khademian (2008) in particular, is in line with modern 
public management theories about policy processes as described above. Central observations 
are that policy making is a continuous process and that individual policies mainly represent 
snapshots of ongoing policy processes. Influencing concrete policy interventions is a means 
to influence the policy process at large. Just as policy processes are continuous, so should be 
the process of integrating environmental considerations. A few key issues that need to be 
paid special attention to when trying to influence policy formation through an I-SEA are 
outlined in the following paragraphs: 
Context sensitivity: Research suggests that a critical success factor for SEA is the ability to 
adjust its scope and methodology to contextual factors (e.g. Hilding-Rydevik and 
Bjarnadóttir, 2007). Hence, I-SEA practitioners need to understand which knowledge and 
actions are timely and useful in each specific policy formulation context. Developing such 
context sensitivity is primarily a learning process occurring at the level of individuals, but 
valuable experiences and tools for context mapping should also be essential elements to 
document in the evaluation of the I-SEA Pilot Program. 
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Discrete Policy Processes may provide Windows of Opportunity for institutional 
change: Ahmed and Sánchez-Triana (2008) and Feldman and Khademian (2008) put the idea 
of „windows of opportunity‟ at the heart of influencing policies. However windows of 
opportunities are often not easy to discover when they open and may close before 
opportunities are seized. Discrete policy processes should be seen as an opportunity for 
interaction which may or may not lead to important policy and institutional changes. Many 
times discrete policy processes are subject to substantial lock-in and domination by vested 
interests and provide only limited opportunities for larger change processes towards 
sustainable development. A key challenge for I-SEA is to utilize the opportunity provided by 
the policy process to move beyond assessing potential impacts of policies and assess the 
broader institutional constraints to environmentally sustainable development. In order to 
know which institutions to focus on the I-SEA team may first identify the policies which 
seem unsustainable and then assess which institutions “control” these policies.  
Since institutions tend to change slowly a key challenge for an I-SEA team is to come up 
with proposals that may facilitate a long term change process. Sometimes this will entail a 
particular focus on strengthening networks or long term constituencies which are needed to 
demand institutional change. Research on public management indicate that through building 
powerful environmental organizations (i.e. public environmental agencies, civil society 
organizations) environmental issues may penetrate the agenda of sectoral actors and 
authorities. These environmental organizations can form a kind of countervailing power to 
other sector interests and force other sector agencies to listen more carefully to affected 
stakeholders, and approve/disapprove public policies, which will stimulate adjustments along 
the policy formation continuum. For example, introducing legal requirements for 
environmental assessment in a country might promote environmental agencies to serve as a 
countervailing power in policy processes. 
A challenge for I-SEA is that it is difficult a priori to identify or explain the link between 
small steps and envisaged large institutional change that can lead to environmentally 
sustainable development. In evaluating the effectiveness of I-SEA, it is hence particularly 
important to assess the relationship between the immediate influence of an action (triggered 
by a specific opportunity occurring at a point in time) and the future influence of that action 
on institutions and on sustainable development. The supposition of I-SEA is that (smaller) 
opportunities in early stages of proposed policy change enable dialogue about the role of 
institutions and the need for change of them.  
Interaction and Social Learning: Clearly all policies have unexpected side effects, which 
may be adverse. Good policies are therefore developed in interaction with those who may be 
affected, being aware that adverse side effects cannot be completely prevented or 
compensated. I-SEA may ideally encourage policy makers to reach out to a broader range of 
stakeholders and prolong the interaction in the future, with the aim of minimizing adverse 
effects of new policies. In this process incremental concessions or changes can be made by 
policy makers and different stakeholders, which themselves may seem symbolic in terms of 
economic significance, but that may be effective levers in the policy process. Interaction and 
a sense of interdependency between stakeholders is a key prerequisite for social learning to 
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occur. A key issue to address for an I-SEA team is hence how policy processes can become 
more reflexive and stimulate interdependency between stakeholders. 
Variety in policy processes: Since societal problems are complex, and therefore create 
ambiguity, it is assumed that they can only be solved by a policy process that meets the 
complexity (variety) of the problem (Ashby, 1956; Uhl-Bien et al 2007). This means that 
many possible solutions should be brought to the fore in policy processes for serious 
consideration. In reality there is rarely only one unique first -best solution. Hence, it is 
unwise a priori to decide on or assess a single solution. Those influencing the organization of 
the policy process (e.g. through institutions), should allow for more variety, so more groups 
are challenged and invited to participate and develop solutions. They should advice decision-
makers to be inspired by many groups, and to organize interaction and dialogue with many 
groups to identify a variety of possibilities (De Bruin et a, 1998; Susskind et al, 2001).  
We learn from this that whatever I-SEA does, to be effective it should bring more variety in 
policy processes. Obviously there is a tradeoff, since variety costs. Implications for I-SEA 
are that it should facilitate action and policy change in at least two respects: 
1) Creating variety: Imagine how a policy process could develop more variety, for example 
by creating transparency, participation and enhance knowledge;  
2) Stimulate policy entrepreneurship: Look for opportunities in the policy process to 
intervene effectively in order to achieve the changes imagined at the first level. In other 
words, I-SEA practitioners should ideally act as policy entrepreneur(s) (Kingdon 1984), by 
e.g. attempting to understand the policy process and the actor networks they are trying to 
influence, and offer their knowledge.  
 
4. IDENTIFYING ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES  
This section presents perspectives on environmental priority setting, and emphasizes the need 
to understand that environmental priorities are a sub-set of a larger set of other (political, 
social, economic etc.) priorities in society, and must be identified in relation to them. A key 
message is that priority setting should not be the exclusive domain of experts, nor of public 
opinion, but rather of both. Economic and scientific tools that can be used to prioritize among 
environmental issues and environmental interventions are briefly outlined before priority 
setting is discussed in relation to SEA. 
 
4.1 Perspectives on Environmental Priority Setting  
Identifying environmental priorities requires an understanding of priority setting in general 
because these are a sub-set of a larger set of other (political, social, economic etc.) priorities 
in society. Hence, identifying environmental priorities must be done in relation to other 
societal issues and is thus a highly political process that cannot be reduced to a purely 
technical matter, or be isolated in an independent process. Politicizing environmental 
 19 
assessment and environmental priority setting
9
 may thus be an effective way of influencing 
policy formation and formulation from an environmental perspective. Moreover, serious 
efforts to identify environmental priorities create opportunities to escape from 
environmentally unsustainable path dependencies. 
Research on environmental priority setting can be structured into two broad areas: 
prioritization of environmental issues and prioritization of environmental interventions, 
respectively. The analytical approaches and processes for these two areas of research vary 
greatly. Specific related issues addressed in the research include: What tools are/can be used 
to prioritize among environmental issues, and environmental interventions, respectively? 
What are the political economy aspects related to these issues? Who sets priorities for 
environmental management? Who sets the environmental agenda? 
Due to limited financial resources, competing general political priorities (health, education, 
environment, employment etc.) and competing specific environmental interests and 
preferences, priorities have to be set in environmental management and in identification of 
environmental interventions.  
Who sets priorities for Environmental Issues? In the identification of who is setting 
environmental priorities, it is critical to assess who is providing the environmental 
information. Research on this issue has inter alia focused on testing the agenda setting 
hypothesis, which claims that governments‟ provision of environmental information is 
generally a very strong and influential means to set the environmental priorities, specifically 
in relation to other political actors and the public opinion (Stephan, 2002). Empirical studies 
by Lynn and Kartez (1994) and Hamilton (1995), who test the hypothesis in cases where 
government discloses pollution information, indeed find that information disclosure 
correlates with media coverage, determines the importance placed upon the issue by citizens 
and shareholders, and facilitates collective action. They also find that environmental NGOs 
act as mediators and conduits of the information, and assist in increasing public interest. 
Further knowledge obtained from this strand of research indicates that transactions costs may 
hamper public involvement in environmental priorities proposed by the government. 
However, explicit efforts to reduce transactions costs counteract this negative relationship 
and increases citizens‟ collective or private actions as well as buy-in on the government‟s 
proposed priorities (Stephan, 2002).  
Although governments rightly have a crucial role to play in environmental priority setting 
there is always the risk that it misuses its powers and mandates. Bias towards scientific 
analysis and government-led expert-based planning and environmental priority setting 
increases the risk of “benevolent despotism” as opposed to environmental planning based on 
public involvement, ownership and priority setting. Arguably, too much focus on quantitative 
priority setting tools and policy making creates a “closed loop” between scientific experts 
and policy makers, which increases the risk of leaving the public outside priority setting, 
                                            
9
 Putting environmental issues on the broader political agenda and linking them with key development issues, 
e.g. poverty reduction and economic development (World Bank, 2005; Ahmed and Sánchez-Triana, 2008). 
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planning and decision-making. Hence, striking the right balance between public involvement 
and scientific underpinnings are crucial to adequate and sustainable environmental policy 
making and policy implementation.  
A point of departure for the analysis provided in this report is the stated objective (World 
Bank, 2005, Ahmed and Sánchez-Triana, 2008) to identify prioritization of environmental 
issues in the policy agenda according to their effects on economic development and poverty 
alleviation. Although important, economic development and poverty alleviation are not 
always used as criteria or references for environmental prioritization. In reality other issues 
and interest may dominate. Nevertheless, economic development and poverty alleviation are 
key development objectives of development cooperation agencies, including the World Bank, 
as well as among governments in developing and developed countries. Hence, a rationale for 
identifying environmental priorities in terms of their effects on economic development and 
poverty alleviation is the assumption (World Bank, 2005) that the these issues are politicized, 
i.e. that they are placed firmly in the policy agenda and catches the attention among key 
politicians.  In the section on policy processes, we have seen that priority setting feeds into 
the policy process, where the agenda of influential actors may change on the basis of 
substantive arguments, but where often substantive argument (i.e. the result of analysis which 
may be supported minorities) do not influence the agenda of influential actors. 
Further, prioritization among bio-physical environmental issues (air pollution, water 
contamination, deforestation etc.) is closely linked with the existing (and often competing) 
environmental interests. These interests are typically communicated by various interest 
groups, which can be relatively more or less influential (“stronger/weaker”) in the final 
priority setting made in the policy process.  
Increasing awareness of the power of information has stimulated increased use of it among 
actors outside the ruling government as a means to influence the environmental agenda and 
priorities. This applies to government opponents in the political sphere, business companies, 
environmental NGOs, media, labour unions etc. In this context it is also evident that the 
extent and quality of the scientific evidence behind the disseminated environmental 
information vary a great deal across actors. 
Although not always perfectly clear or delineated, a dividing line can be drawn between 
priority setting based on expert knowledge, on the one hand, the preferences expressed by  
public opinion, on the other. Expert knowledge presupposes involvement of experts, who are 
expected to prioritize (or alternatively, suggest prioritization of) environmental issues under 
scrutiny in an objective (neutral and impartial) manner by use of technical assessment tools 
(see examples below). Alternatively, preferences among the public opinion are obtained by 
consulting various stakeholders; as opposed to expert judgment, environmental priorities of 
the public are defined as the sum of individual subjective (intuitive) preferences.  
Depending on the level of democratic governance characterizing the prioritization process, 
expert knowledge and public opinion may be integrated to a more or lesser extent. This is 
partly driven by the fact that knowledge and expert assessments seldom provide only one 
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solution or represent neutrality or impartiality (Owens et al, 2004). As pointed out by Wilkins 
(2003), increasing acknowledgment of practical knowledge and wisdom among the public 
has increased the need for, and attention to, negotiation between experts and public 
stakeholders in priority setting. This is reinforced by the fact that application and influence of 
technical methods depends on the institutional and cultural context. Many specific technical 
approaches exist, but due to contextual differences there is no generalized way of 
determining a priori the best method or approach. Knowledge and priorities need to be 
negotiated and contextualized. Hence, priority setting is conducted in arenas involving 
different stakeholders (including experts and project/reform proponents), who possess 
different analytical and knowledge capacities, and different negotiating powers (Rijsberman 
and van de Ven, 2000).  
Who sets priorities for Environmental Management? Much like the priority setting of 
environmental issues, priority setting for environmental interventions is subject to 
stakeholder preferences, power relations, belief in technical rationality, and the relative 
influence of proclaimed technical experts. However, there is not necessarily a direct 
correspondence between environmental issues and environmental interventions. Priority 
environmental issues (defined in terms of the largest environmental threats or impacts) do not 
always translate into priority environmental interventions for various reasons. Some of the 
key environmental problems may be too difficult or too costly to address at present. 
Interventions for mitigation may have to wait until costs are reduced, or until political, social, 
scientific or other issues and responsibilities are sorted out. Consequently, environmental 
priorities might focus on picking “low-hanging fruits” to achieve cost-effective and 
politically possible interventions in the short run.  
Admittedly, there is a vast literature on tools for environmental analysis. While it is outside 
the scope of this report to present it, we present below some tools to prioritize among 
environmental issues, and tools to prioritize among environmental interventions, 
respectively: 
Tools to prioritize among environmental issues: The tools to identify, analyse and 
prioritize among environmental issues can broadly be divided into bio-physical assessments 
and economic assessments. Bio-physical assessment tools include, but are not limited to, 
comparative risk analysis, geo-based mapping, modeling and forecasting analysis, quality of 
life assessments, carrying capacity analysis, ecologically based Multi-criteria Analysis and 
vulnerability analysis. Economic assessments tools to prioritize among environmental issues 
include e.g. economic damage assessment, opportunity-cost analysis, loss of productivity 
assessment, preventive expenditure analysis.  
Tools to prioritize among environmental interventions: Tools to prioritize among 
environmental interventions include expert judgment, public opinion surveys; public 
participation (“popular voting”) based rankings and  ratings, comparisons or combinations of 
bio-physical and monetary assessments, which attempt to reconcile pros and cons of a 
particular proposed reform or policy (process). Specific issues and key concepts to consider 
in priority setting pertaining environmental interventions include: (i) time horizon/inter-
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temporal aspects, (ii) risks and uncertainties, (iii) distributional aspects; across geographical 
regions, different income groups, impacts on the poor or disadvantaged (vulnerable groups 
such as handicapped, women, children, ethnic/cultural/religious minorities etc.); (iv) 
ecological, social and economic sustainability, efficiency and effectiveness, and 
transparency. 
Principal tools for economic assessments, which are used to set priorities for environmental 
interventions, are cost-benefit analysis, cost-utility analysis, and cost-effectiveness analysis. 
Provided that it is appropriately undertaken, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) provides 
information on the allocative efficiency of an investment, and take into account all costs and 
benefits relevant to the investment, distribution effects as well as (costs and benefits of) 
future impacts. In essence, CBA investigates society‟s gains of a project, program or policy 
reform in relation to its costs.  Advantages of conducting CBA for priority setting is that it 
provides the decision-maker with alternatives which use the same (monetary) unit for 
comparison and transparency.  Although criticized (see e.g. Hausman and Diamond, 1994; 
(Hughey et al, 2003), modern techniques for non-market valuation (e.g. contingent 
valuation), offers opportunities to identify environmental costs and benefits.  
Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) is typically used to identify the least cost alternative to 
meet a certain (environmental) objective. In the context of priority setting CEA is in some 
respects more attractive than CBA since it avoids some of the controversies associated with 
CBA in the measurement of environmental benefits in monetary units. On the other hand 
CEA still requires data for each alternative under investigation, costs of each alternative and 
bio-physical or other some other non-monetary indicators representing the objective. The fact 
that CEA does not harmonize program/reform benefits into comparable units (unlike CBA) 
reduces the comparability across alternatives, compared to CBA.  
Cost-utility analysis (CUA) is used to identify and compare project/reform alternatives when 
there is agreement on attaining a specific utility objective (e.g. an environmental health 
quality standard) and when there are several options and costs associated with achieving it. A 
slightly different approach to understand and use CUA in the identification of priorities is to 
maximize an agreed environmental outcome within a given budget envelope. This has been 
applied in the area of biodiversity conservation (Weitzman, 1998; van der Heide et al, 2005). 
 
4.2 SEA and Environmental Priority Setting  
Priority setting can be influenced through the application of analytical tools, which provide 
insights as to what the impacts of sectoral development are, and how these can be compared 
with alternative development. Priority setting can and should arguably also be influenced by 
stakeholder dialogue in an open political process. For this to happen the proposed analytical 
and process tools for environmental priority setting in World Bank (2005) may be useful 
means in SEA to “politicize” key environmental issues in the broader policy agenda. The 
suggested focus on risks, costs and public participation creates links to (impacts on) to 
economic development and poverty alleviation. Specifically, by making comparative risk 
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assessments and cost of environmental damage-studies, and using various (complementary) 
participatory techniques, there are certainly opportunities that key environmental issues can 
be identified and aligned with other key development themes in the policy process, largely 
due to political sensitivity to risks, economic costs and – in most cases – popular consent.  
Consider a broader set of environmental analyses for priority setting: Provided that an 
SEA involves the right type of competence and capacity for the kinds of assessment tools 
alluded to above and in World Bank (2005), such analyses facilitate priority setting and may 
create opportunities for political uptake. However, it should be kept in mind that these 
proposed tools only form a sub-set of a larger set of analytical and priority setting tools used 
in SEA (OECD DAC, 2006). As indicated above, other priority setting tools, which 
potentially can be used in the analytical step of an I-SEA process tied to a specific policy 
process, also include e.g. bio-physical assessments such as quality of life assessments, 
carrying capacity analysis, ecologically based Multi-criteria Analysis and vulnerability 
analysis, or other economic assessments like opportunity-cost analysis, loss of productivity 
assessment, preventive expenditure analysis, which may be components of cost-benefit 
analysis, cost-utility analysis or cost-effectiveness analysis. There is thus a large set of 
analytical tools to chose between, and a priori no first-best assessment tool for priority 
setting; the choice has to be made depending on the terms of reference and broader 
conditions framing the I-SEA process e.g. political acceptance and buy-in, availability of 
data and other information for quantitative (bio-physical and economic) assessment, links 
with poverty and other key development themes, availability of expertise to undertake the 
assessment, etc. and coupled with stakeholder representation techniques, see further in 
chapter 5. 
Regarding economic assessments as part of an I-SEA process it may be that other economic 
analytical tools are effective in politicizing the environmental issues than the proposed cost 
of environmental damage studies. Examples of such analyses include benefits of 
environmental management-studies for prioritizing various environmental interventions, or 
public revenue assessments for using/depleting various natural resources, or studies of cost-
effectiveness of various environmental economic policy instruments such as environmental 
taxes, fees, levies or subsidies. Such (studies of) policy instruments may be compared with 
other policy instruments (e.g. command and control like environmental regulation, norms and 
standards, or environmental information disclosure, environmental education) as part of the 
I-SEA process.  
Local capacity development for environmental priority setting: A common feature for 
applying proposed tools for environmental priority setting is the need for strong local 
capacity. Hence, applying any of the quantitative tools above requires significant elements of 
capacity and continuous learning in local institutions, which are subject to policy reforms and 
I-SEA. Hence, strengthening the use of tools for environmental priority setting in I-SEA also 
requires strengthening local institutions’ capacity to carry out such analyses, understand the 
results and implications for policy design/reform, and an increased ownership among local 
actors of the analyses underpinning policy processes.  
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Today, many of the impact centered SEAs conducted in low income countries are 
operationalised by foreign experts and resource persons with limited transfer of knowledge to 
local expertise. This constrains the possibilities for local analysis and local priority setting. 
Although the proposed I-SEA methodology recommends use of both quantitative and 
participatory methods (to facilitate a combination of expert judgment and broad-based 
popular involvement and prioritization in the policy process), there is a need to also stress the 
need for structured, institutional learning and capacity building for locally owned and locally 
implemented analysis for priority setting. This provides the rationale for posing the 
questions: Who conducts the I-SEA? Based on whose analysis are the priorities set? Too 
often the technical analysis is carried out by expatriate experts, who typically fail to facilitate 
local learning in their prioritization analyses. Increasing the involvement of local resource 
persons in the prioritization analyses contributes not only to enhanced local ownership and 
buy-in, but also functions as a cost-effective means to strengthen local analytical capacity 
and institutions (e.g. government agencies)   
Selectivity, timing and sequencing of I-SEA is critical: In many instances, local capacity 
and government resources are limited for making environmental policy analysis. Hence, as 
indicated in World Bank (2005) and in Ahmed and Sanchez-Triana (2008) there is a need to 
be selective in the choice of I-SEAs in relation to proposed and envisioned discrete policy 
changes. Although policy formation is a continuous process, there are windows of 
opportunity for discrete interventions, and in order to have identified and (publicly) endorsed 
the official environmental priorities, there is a need to select key policy processes 
strategically and very selectively. From an environmental point of view, some policy 
processes or reforms are more important than others. Although some aspects or elements of 
I-SEA are continuous, the timing and sequencing of discrete I-SEA interventions are critical 
to achieve impact in the policy formation process. Linked to this is the fact that priorities 
arrived at in a policy based I-SEA are certainly not eternally valid, and may have to be 
revisited and redefined. Hence, as indicated in World Bank (2005), priority-setting processes 
should take place periodically in light of policy revisions, new information, new research 
knowledge, changing preferences, and changing institutions. Accordingly, tools and criteria 
for priority setting should be revisited and possibly also redefined.  
 
5. STRENGTHENING STAKEHOLDER REPRESENTATION 
As indicated in the section on policy processes, the involvement of a variety of stakeholders 
in decision making increases the likelihood that solutions to complex problems like 
sustainable development will emerge. This section begins by briefly discussing different 
types of stakeholder representation before identifying common obstacles to “sound” 
participation and how these can be overcome. The section ends with identifying key 
challenges for I-SEA in relation to stakeholder representation. 
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5.1 Perspectives on Stakeholder Representation 
Participation or representation? Representation of stakeholders in policy processes may be 
defined as the way in which affected groups can have an influence on public policy. There is 
a gradual difference between participation by representation and direct participation: 
representation can also be indirect participation by means of actors (organizations or people) 
who represent a stakeholder group. For example, a non-governmental organisation or a 
ministry of indigenous people may represent indigenous people.  
Different types of Stakeholder Representation: Five intensities of involvement of 
stakeholder groups which have an increasing degree of influence on the outcomes of a public 
policy process, can be distinguished (Edwards 2007)
10
: 
 Information exchange: citizens are informed and may ask questions during hearings; 
there is no commitment to take them into account;  
 Consultation: citizens are invited to comment on government proposals; this may 
occur through surveys or in hearings; government commits itself to take them 
seriously but they cannot be held accountable for it; 
 Advising: citizens may come up with their own problems and suggest solutions; 
government takes it seriously and promises accountability on how the suggestions 
have been used; 
 Co-production: stakeholders representing different interests co-design policies with 
public officers and politicians; in principle these solutions are taken over but well-
accounted for amendments are possible; 
 Co-decision-making: stakeholders jointly design solutions and these are adopted. 
Direct influence can only occur from the third intensity onwards, because only in those cases 
policy makers are responsive to results of stakeholder involvement. Information exchange 
and consultation may have a more indirect effect; it may be the first step in a learning process 
that may have visible results only in subsequent policies. Stakeholders may also participate 
uninvited in the policy process, for example by demonstrating or lobbying, or by 
implementing or ignoring public policies if they can.  
Obstacles to Stakeholder Representation: The extensive literature on participation in 
policy processes has revealed that positive effects of participatory approaches to public 
policy making cannot be taken for granted. A ladder of participation has been suggested, 
ranging from “manipulation” and “therapy” (in fact, non-participation), to “partnership”, 
“delegated power” and “citizen control”. In between there are different degrees of 
stakeholder involvement: “informing”, “consultation”, and “placation”, in which 
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 The number of possibilities, forms and techniques for stakeholder representation is large. For an overview see 
for example Kende-Robb and Van Wicklin (2008) or Innes and Booher (1999).  
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participation is an “empty” exercise, not meant to have any real consequences (Arnstein 
1969).  
Common obstacles to sound stakeholder representation include: 
Weak interests are difficult to identify: It is not always clear ex ante who the “weak interests” 
are and whose voice needs to be enhanced. In relation to for example SEA there is a 
considerable amount of uncertainty of environmental effects of policies so it is not always 
known which groups will be affected and which groups should be involved.  
Their voice is often weak: Local communities, municipalities or national arenas are typically 
not level playing fields. Organizing participation in unequal initial settings may give the most 
powerful most voice. According to Edwards (2007) the following measures help promote 
public participation or and stakeholder representation: (a) give participants access to all 
available information, b) allow participants to question witnesses and to consult experts, c) 
use an independent moderator, and (d) secure checks and balances in governance (as 
elaborated in the section on institutions). 
It is difficult to involve larger groups that are not organized: Weak groups, let alone future 
generations, are often excluded from the current policy debate. It is widely known that this 
gets worse as public policies become more strategic and abstract, because it is difficult for 
people at large to imagine the links between abstract policy proposals, the individual 
situation and individual and local/global impacts. A next best option can be to consult 
national advocates such as civil society organizations, but these organizations may have their 
own agendas and not adequately represent (individual) stakeholders‟ interests or 
communicate with the group they are supposed to represent. 
Policy makers’ intentions may not be sincere: Policy makers may use “participatory speak” 
without attaching any real content to it. Legislation or other mechanisms may require them to 
invite stakeholders for participation, but in reality there is no willingness to use their input, at 
least visibly in the short term. 
Vested interests do not participate in the process: If powerful groups with great stakes in a 
certain policy process do not participate in the policy formulation phase there is a risk that 
implementation will be obstructed by these groups, since they in fact control it when it comes 
to implementation. 
If these types of obstacles to sound stakeholder representation are not addressed, then this 
“empty participation” may lead to participation-fatigue and increasing distrust between 
government and civil society, or between government and society at large (Molenaers and 
Renard 2006).  
Addressing Obstacles to Stakeholder Representation: Stakeholder representation is 
severely restricted in policy making in many countries (e.g. Transparency International, 
2008). A completely open and transparent society is probably unrealistic, and since it is 
always painful for those who are forced to open up, the development towards more 
transparency and participation will most likely be a gradual shift towards a more democratic 
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culture and procedures. Ways to address common obstacles and increase opportunities for 
stakeholder representation include: 
Institutionalize formal laws that require participation or representation: Laws requiring 
governments to engage with stakeholders when developing certain policies can be an 
important basic institution for sound stakeholder representation. The basic rationale is that 
the existence of such laws provides a lever for national advocates to demand more openness. 
For example laws on Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) normally require some form 
of stakeholder representation. However, while EIA laws have been implemented in countries 
all over the world, its contribution to enhanced stakeholder representation and influence on 
actual decision making vary a lot. Wood (2002) asserts that EIA and SEA may be effective to 
mitigate some smaller effects, but there is little evidence that it actually leads to a 
fundamental change of strategies and policies required for attaining sustainable development. 
Although introduction of EIA laws may promote increased participation and stakeholder 
representation, it is not a warrant of success. Unless the legislation is backed up by adequate 
institutions for its implementation it risks being encapsulated and be made harmless by 
opponents (Dijkstra (2005), p. 461).  
Propositions for public participation formulated in manuals and guidance developed by the 
World Bank and other institutions may be significant contributions to improved stakeholder 
representation. However, governments adhering to international treaties
11
 can also be a step 
towards institutionalizing environment-related stakeholder representation.  
Strengthen Accountability: Bekkers et al. (2007) argue that participation processes should be 
linked to formal democratic organs or decision-making institutions such as elected councils 
or parliaments. These formal representative organs can hold governments to account and may 
make governments responsive to stakeholders‟ interests. Such a strengthening of institutions 
that make states more accountable to citizens‟ demands may create incentives for both policy 
makers and the public for increased participation. Stakeholders may be more inclined to 
participate since they know the policymakers have an incentive to take them seriously. 
Conversely, policy makers may be more inclined to listen to stakeholders since they know 
stakeholders with opposing views have been granted greater possibilities to issue complaints 
at later (and more costly) stages of the policy making process (see also separate section on 
Social Accountability below).  
Involve weak and other stakeholders: Beierle and Konisky (2001) conjecture that one of the 
reasons of implementation failure was that neither all socio-economic groups nor all relevant 
interests have been represented in the participation process; some excluded groups were 
apparently able to prevent the implementation of the agreed solutions. Possible remedies 
include enhancing the voice of the weak interests in participatory processes and (to promote) 
involvement of all inter-dependent socio-economic groups and all possible interests.  
                                            
11
 E.g. the Espoo convention on trans-boundary environmental assessment (UNECE 1991), the Aarhus 
convention granting the public rights regarding access to information, public participation and access to justice 
in governmental decision-making processes (UNECE 1998), and the Kiev protocol on SEA implementing the 
Espoo convention (UNECE 2003) 
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Strengthen networks that can demand improved stakeholder representation:  The emergence 
and growth of influential organizations which claim a stake in policy processes, can be an 
important move towards improved representation. Supporting such a development can be 
seen as a form of network management (e.g. Kickert et.al. 1997). In the longer run these 
organizations can be important for the creation of institutions, which assure future continued 
representation of weak interests or enforcement of transparency laws. 
Focus on small improvements when the opportunities for broad stakeholder representation 
are limited: In some cases - where the possibilities for broad stakeholder representation are 
limited - it may be possible to take small but important steps towards broadening 
perspectives in a policy process. It might for example be possible to, for the first time, 
moderate a dialogue between two ministries, which are not accustomed to listening to each 
other, or to discuss options that seemed impossible to address before. It might also be 
possible to get politicians, who represent sectoral interests, to raise questions in public about 
sustainable development, or to raise the need of considering certain institutional changes, like 
subscribing to international treaties. These small steps may be important, especially if they 
facilitate more long term changes.  
 
5.2 SEA and Stakeholder Representation 
Ahmed and Sánchez-Triana (2008; p.189) suggest that I-SEA based participatory approaches 
should identify weak and vulnerable groups and amplify their voice in policy formation. In 
this way the likelihood increases that policy planning and implementation are responsive to 
views and preferences of multiple stakeholders, including the weak and vulnerable in society. 
The creation and maintenance of a community of participation is seen as central to assure 
that a variety of perspectives are represented in policy formation (World Bank, 2005). While 
it is clearly difficult to prescribe in general how stakeholders ought to be identified and 
represented in highly context dependent SEAs, the following key issues merit specific 
attention in I-SEA: 
More people or more perspectives? Public participation is a key ingredient in most SEAs. 
It is important to note that the World Bank approach to stakeholder representation does not 
necessarily suggest a larger number of people participating in the policy process, but rather 
ensuring representation of a larger number of perspectives, especially those of the weak and 
vulnerable.   
How are the perspectives of the weak and vulnerable identified? As stated above it is not 
always clear ex ante who the “weak and vulnerable” are. How can an I-SEA team go about to 
assure that the “right” perspectives are represented in the process? Specific attention may be 
paid to assuring that perspectives represented are not biased with respect to gender, age, 
ethnicity or religious beliefs.  
How can communities of participation be created and maintained? World Bank (2005) 
suggests that the creation of a community of participation is central to facilitate inclusive 
management in an iterative policy process. Communities of participation are not fixed 
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entities but “any particular policy problem/choice opportunity is an occasion to create or 
modify the community of participation” (ibid, p. 36). Specific attention needs to be paid to 
how such communities of participation can be created and maintained during and after an I-
SEA of a discrete policy formulation process. 
 
6. ANALYZING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITIES AND 
CONSTRAINTS 
Analyzing and strengthening institutions and governance dimensions are put forward as key 
features of institution-centred SEA by the World Bank (2005).  This shift in thinking about 
environmental assessment can be seen as a reflection of the remarkable growth in attention to 
the role of institutions for economic and social development within the social sciences during 
the last decades. This chapter discusses how the concept of institutions can be disentangled, 
understood and analyzed in the context of SEA. 
 
6.1 Perspectives on Institutions 
What are institutions? The study of institutions has a long tradition, but a new 
institutionalism emerged in the late 1980s as a reaction to the then dominating actor centered 
analyses in the social sciences (Nilsson, 2005; Vatn, 2005). The literature on institutions is 
very rich and complex and several different definitions of institutions exist. One of the most 
famous is put forward by Nobel laureate Douglas North: “Institutions are the humanly 
designed constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up of formal 
constraints (e.g., rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (e.g., norms of behaviour, 
conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics. Together 
they define the incentive structure of societies and specifically economies.” (North, 1994) 12 
The concept of institutions is thus much broader than that of organizations. While institutions 
make up the rules, organizations
13
 are the players.  The distinction between institutions and 
organizations is important since there is a tendency to equate the two concepts in discussions 
on institutional capacity building for improved environmental management (OECD, 1999). A 
too limited focus on environment sector organizations (such as environment ministries and 
agencies) risks diverting the attention from other institutions which may be equally or more 
important for environmentally sustainable development.  
                                            
12
 For alternative definitions, see for example the book by Arild Vatn, 2005 “Institutions and the Environment”. 
North‟s definition can be said to be a form of rational institutionalism which emphasise incentives and how 
rational individuals act within the constraints of rules. A normative institutionalism on the other hand stresses 
that values and norms and “a logic of appropriateness” are the central factors in explaining behaviour and 
choice (March and Olsen, 1989). 
13
 According to North (1990:5) organizations can be thought of as “groups of individuals bound by some 
common purpose to achieve objectives”. 
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There are various attempts to disentangle the broad view of institutions as formal and 
informal constraints or rules into more tangible analytical units. In its World Development 
Report (2003) the World Bank depicts institutions as a continuum where on the informal end 
they go from trust and other forms of social capital to networks for coordination. On the 
formal end institutions include codified rules and laws as well as formal organizations such 
as courts and government agencies (figure 3). The World Bank (2003:37) suggests that 
“institutions must perform three key functions in order to contribute to a sustainable 
development: (i) pick up signals about needs and problems …(which) involves generating 
information, giving citizens a voice, responding to feedback, and fostering learning; (ii) 
balance interests by negotiating change and forging agreements, and by avoiding stalemates 
and conflicts; (iii) execute and implement solutions by credibly following through on 
agreements” 
Figure 3: Institutions as formal and informal rules 
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Source: World Bank, 2003 
Williamson (2000) identifies different levels of institutional analysis (figure 4)
14
. In this 
framework, the institutions at higher levels constrains choices at lower levels, but changes at 
lower levels can also occur through different feedback mechanisms, generating changes at 
the higher levels. 
                                            
14
 The Institutions and Development framework (IAD) is an analogous layered framework for institutional 
analysis developed by Elinor Ostrom and colleagues (Ostrom, 2005). The levels of analysis in the IAD 
framework are the constitutional arena, the collective choice arena and the action arena. The IAD framework is 
much more elaborate than the one discussed by Williamson but it has not been possible to go into details here.  
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The first level identified by Williamson is Social Embeddedness, which comprises informal 
institutions such as norms, religion and culture. Institutions at this level have evolutionary 
origins and normally change very slowly (100-1000 years according to Williamson)
15
. 
The second level is the Institutional Environment or the formal rules of the game, including 
constitutions and the executive, legislative, judicial and bureaucratic functions of 
government. The definition and enforcement of property rights and contract laws are 
important elements at this level. Changes in the Institutional Environment normally happen 
slowly (10-100 years), but sudden crises can occasionally produce a sharp break from 
established procedures. The third level is the Institutions of Governance where much of the 
day to day policy making takes place. Institutions at this level include the different parts of 
the government bureaucracy and laws and regulations. Changes in institutions at this level 
normally happen more rapidly (1-10 years). The fourth level is Resource allocation and 
employment where incentives resulting from the institutions on the other levels affect the 
choices of the different actors in society. Change at this level is continuous. 
 
Figure 4: Levels in Institutional Analysis 
Level Frequency of change
Customs, traditions, norms, 
religion
100-1000 yrs.
Formal rules of the game: 
(judiciary, bureaucracy etc)
10-100 yrs.
Governance: Play of the game: 
(contracts, aligning structures) 1-10 yrs.
Resource allocation and 
employment (budget, policy) continuous
 
Source: Adapted from Williamson, 2000 
Which institutions are important for sustainable development?  There is a growing 
consensus that good institutions matter greatly for economic and democratic development as 
well as social and environmental sustainability. Institutions are for example increasingly seen 
as one of the key fundamental causes of long-run growth and cross-country differences in 
economic performance (Acemoglu et al., 2004). Similarly institutions are viewed as essential 
to the solution of many environmental problems which require “...motivating individuals to 
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 Chang (2007, chapter 9) however describe how cultures can change more rapidly when incentives and/or 
transaction costs change. 
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take a long-term perspective and the interest of a wide diversity of unknown individuals into 
account when making choices” (Ostrom et al., 1993, p.214). There are however a number of 
different perspectives on what institutions need to be put in place to generate these 
favourable outcomes, for example: 
Institutions for economic development: Rodrik (2000) identifies five types of non-market 
institutions necessary for supporting a flourishing market economy: property rights; 
regulatory institutions; institutions for macro- economic stabilization; institutions for social 
insurance; and institutions of conflict management.    
Institutions for good governance: The for cross-country comparisons widely used governance 
indicators produced by Kaufman et al (2008)
16
 include six different dimensions: Voice and 
Accountability; Political Stability and Absence of Violence; Government Effectiveness; 
Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; and  Control of Corruption. These indicators can be seen as 
pointing to the kind of institutions considered to be essential for good governance.  
Institutions for environmental sustainability: OECD
17
 (2008) identifies specific 
environmental institutions, such as constitutional provisions for a right to a clean 
environment, environmental protection laws and public environmental agencies as key 
prerequisites for environmentally sustainable development. Building on the broader 
framework from the World Development Report 2003 (World Bank, 2003) Pillai and Lunde 
(2006) develops a checklist for assessing the institutional capacity for environmental 
management in different countries (Appendix 1).  
For several reasons it is however problematic to identify a generic set of good institutions 
that contribute to sustainable development. Since informal norms matters greatly for the 
outcomes of formal rules the institutional solutions to specific problems will be highly 
context dependent. Conversely, the same institutional function (e.g. picking up signals) can 
take many different institutional forms. A meaningful answer to which institutions are 
important for sustainable development, must thus first involve an identification of the 
specific obstacles to sustainable development in a particular context.  An institutional 
analysis should begin by identifying “institutions for what”. 
How can institutions be transformed? If institutions are so crucial for development, why 
do countries not improve them? This simple question has puzzled researchers. North (1994) 
notes that institutions are not necessarily or even usually designed to be socially efficient. 
Formal rules are rather created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to 
create new rules. Acemoglu et al (2004) portray institutions as having long historical roots 
(or “colonial origins”) and being persistent to change since powerful groups block reforms 
and possess de jure and/or de facto political power. The search for a general theory on how to 
improve institutions is by some seen as the Holy Grail of social sciences (Acemoglu et al 
2004).  
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 OECD DAC/EPOC Task Team on Governance and Capacity Development for Natural Resource and 
Environmental Management 
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The slow changing nature of norms as well as their importance in the enforcement of formal 
rules is one important factor explaining the difficulties involved in changing institutions.   
While formal rules may be changed overnight, informal norms usually change only 
gradually. Since norms provide “legitimacy” to a set of rules, societies that adopt the formal 
rules of another society will have very different performance characteristics because of 
different informal norms and enforcement (North, 1994).  The difficulties in transferring the 
formal political and economic institutions from Western market economies to Eastern 
European economies in the 1990s is a commonly cited example where the same formal 
institutions resulted in very different outcomes (North, 1994; Rodrik, 2000). 
Rodrik (2000:11-14) distinguishes between a “blueprint approach” and a “local knowledge 
(or experimentalist) approach” for institutional change. In the blueprint approach best 
practice solutions from elsewhere are identified, imported and implemented. However, given 
the many different perspectives of what best practice institutions are, the current attention to 
“getting the institutions right” may lead to a long wish lists of policy reforms that is 
impossible to fulfill for poor countries (Grindle, 2004; Rodrik, 2006)
18
. The local knowledge 
approach to institutional change on the other hand stresses that institutions need to be 
developed locally relying on hands on experience, local knowledge and experimentation. 
This view can however serve privileged interests who want to conserve a certain set of 
institutions despite that there are clearly better institutions elsewhere. It can also be quite 
costly to develop all the institutions locally when imported blueprints may serve just as well 
in some cases. Rodrik suggests that the blueprint approach may be appropriate for more 
narrow and technical issues, while large scale institutional development by and large requires 
a process of discovery of local needs and capabilities. Participatory political institutions can 
be seen as a “meta-institution” that can assure that institutional development is grounded in 
local knowledge (Rodrik, 2000). They also can be seen as levers that stimulate a social 
learning process, over time creating more legitimacy (democratic support) of making new 
steps in institutional development (Nooteboom, 2007).  
 
6.2 SEA and Institutions 
Despite the central role of institutions in I-SEA the concept is not explicitly defined or 
discussed in the World Bank publications on Policy Level SEA (World Bank, 2005; Ahmed 
and Sanchez-Triana, 2008). However several  aspects that should form part of an institutional 
analysis as part of an I-SEA are identified: (i) historical analysis to understand how current 
policies become locked in: (ii) political economy analysis including goals, values behaviors 
and incentives of stakeholders involved in policy formulation and implementation; (iii) 
analysis of inter-sectoral (horizontal) and vertical coordination mechanisms within 
government to better understand implementation hurdles; (iv) analysis of mechanisms to 
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 Or as Rodrik (2006) notes “telling poor countries in Africa or Latin America that they have to set their sights 
on the best-practice institutions of the U.S. or Sweden is like telling them that the only way to develop is to 
become developed – hardly useful policy advice!”. 
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promote social accountability and learning; (v) identification of efficient and politically 
feasible interventions to overcome priority issues (Ahmed and Sánchez-Triana, 2008, page 
189).  
This implicit definition captures the Bank‟s idea that an SEA needs to go beyond assessing 
the potential social and environmental impacts of policies and address the forces that drive 
policies (and their implementation). It also suggests that institutional analysis as part of an 
SEA should take a broad focus and not be limited to specific institutional arrangements for 
environmental management.  
However, there seems to be a need for further and more specific guidance and learning on 
how to perform good institutional assessments as part of SEAs. Important lessons can be 
learnt from the growing focus on governance and institutional factors in “SEA-literature”. 
For example Turnpenny et al. (2008) undertook a layered form of institutional analysis, 
based on a framework similar to Wiliamson‟s above, to analyze capacities and constraints for 
integrated policy assessment in four different European countries. On the micro level the 
analysis concerned the individuals involved in doing assessments in the bureaucracy and the 
availability of resources (time, money staff) and human resources (skills, educational 
background etc) for doing the assessments. On the meso level organizational issues such as 
management structures, coordination procedures and incentive systems were analyzed. 
Finally, on the macro level the analysis focused on wider issues such as the administrative 
and legal context as well as the role of stakeholders in the decision making process. These 
types of layered framework could be a way of structuring institutional analyses conducted as 
part of SEAs as well.  
Lessons can also be drawn from the rapidly growing body of broader literature on 
environmentally related institutional assessments. A recent review of institutional 
assessments conducted as part of World Bank Country Environmental Analyses indicate that 
institutional assessments need to:  (i) move beyond an analysis of organizational mandates, 
functions and gaps in formal rules, to include informal rules, political-economy issues and 
power relationships; (ii) put a stronger focus on the demand side of environmental 
governance and the role of private sector and civil society institutions; (iii) include sub-
national levels and resource flows between national and sub-national levels; and (iv) focus on 
specific themes and sectors (Pillai, 2008).  
The importance of including an analysis of budget processes in institutional assessments is 
highlighted by Lawson and Bird (2008). Based on a four country comparative study
19
 they 
conclude that while the environmental policy and legislative frameworks were generally well 
articulated and clear the most important obstacle to implementation lie in deficient financing 
of public environmental actions. The study identifies the existence of three essentially 
parallel budget processes determining the level and direction of environmental financing: (i) 
a national budget process limited essentially to the recurrent budget; (ii) a process for the 
allocation of external project finance; and (iii) a process of negotiating rights to collect 
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revenues and fees and retain control over their use. This fragmented budgetary system 
resulted in generally very low budgets for recurrent expenditures to cover core functions such 
as monitoring, control and supervision and relatively large portfolios of externally financed 
projects
20
. This was found to have lead to a diversion from addressing national environmental 
priorities. Another consequence of this fragmented budgetary system is that a large part of 
the resources available for environmental action are beyond the control of the Ministry of 
Finance and ultimately also the Parliament undermining accountability and public 
management capacities. 
While it may be appropriate to assess the institutional capacities and constraints for 
environmental management on a national level, for many SEAs of sector reforms a more 
focused assessment of institutions of particular relevance for the sector is more appropriate. 
For example in relation to forestry or mining reforms a thorough  assessment of the 
institutions for land tenure may be more important than assessing the formal mandates of 
different environmental functions on a national level. The scope and priorities for 
institutional assessments to be conducted as part of an SEA will thus always be important to 
discuss. A good understanding of the context of the particular reform process will be key for 
making good judgments on what institutions with environmental relevance to prioritize.  
 
7. STRENGTHENING SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
Promoting social accountability as part of an I-SEA is identified by the World Bank (2005) 
as a key mechanism to assure that I-SEA can have an influence beyond a discrete policy 
intervention and contribute to more long term improvements of environmental governance. 
Accountability is however a broad concept with different interpretations and has been 
described as “probably one of the most basic yet most intractable of political concepts” (Hill, 
2005, p. 259). This section begins by relating social accountability to other types of 
accountability and then discusses accountability in relation to SEA. 
 
7.1 Perspectives on Accountability 
Accountability basically concerns preventing and redressing the abuse of political power 
through three general dimensions: i) by subjecting power to the threat of sanctions 
(enforceability); ii) by obliging it to be exercised in a transparent way; and iii) by forcing it to 
justify its acts (Schedler, 1999). Accountability refers to a relationship between two parties
21
 
and a first step to understanding this relationship is to identify: i) who is the agent being held 
accountable? ; ii) who is the agent demanding accountability? iii) for what type of activities 
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 As an example: in 2005/06 the Ghanaian Environmental Protection Agency was managing 28 separate 
projects financed by 10 different funding agencies. 
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 A is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A‟s actions and decisions, to justify them, and to 
suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct.  
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or duties are organizations or people being held accountable?; iv) in what forum are they 
being held to account?; and v) how is accountability being delivered?  
Political Accountability refers to the role of political institutions in facilitating for the public 
in holding government, civil servants and politicians accountable. A distinction is often made 
between vertical and horizontal accountability. The existence of free and regular elections is 
often viewed as the most basic mechanisms for assuring vertical accountability in a 
democratic system. In theory elections allow citizens to punish politicians and the credible 
threat of losing office in the next period compels policy makers to respond to voters‟ interests 
(Adsèra, 2003). Information asymmetry (i.e. differences in access and capacity to interpret 
information) between the public and politicians however severely limits the possibilities for 
citizens to hold politicians accountable through elections
22
.  
Another type of vertical accountability, which is a top-down relationship, is when elected 
representatives are to appoint and hold the public servants in the bureaucracy accountable for 
the implementation of different policies. A similar problem of information asymmetry is 
present also here since it is difficult for the politicians to know exactly how the civil servants 
go about implementing policies (see section on policy processes above). This is in one way a 
classical public administration problem where there is a tension between rule based control 
of the administration and the discretion of public servants necessary to do a good job. Civil 
service reform, improvement of internal auditing, evaluation and surveillance are normally 
central elements of pro-accountability public administration reforms. This is sometimes 
referred to as administrative accountability and professional accountability. In weaker 
political economies these are many times highly contentious issues since, as noted by Batley 
(2004) ”...the bureaucratic arena is itself highly politicized and inter-connected with societal 
interests; it is where power, employment and patronage are concentrated, so the stakes are 
high”. 
Horizontal accountability refers to a relationship between more or less independent state 
agencies that monitor and discipline each other and presupposes an internal functional 
differentiation of the state (Schedler, 1999). The sharing of powers between the executive, 
legislative and judiciary together with checks and balances between different branches of 
government constitute the most typical mechanism for horizontal political accountability. In 
practice this balancing of powers is weak in many countries. Veit et al. (2008) pay specific 
attention to the need to strengthen the role of the legislature in many African countries in 
order to address the often neglected environmental priorities of rural populations. The lack of 
autonomy and authority of many African parliaments in relation to the executive, severely 
undermine accountability.  
Other examples of horizontal accountability mechanisms are the creation of independent 
Pro-Accountability Agencies, such as corruption control bodies, Ombudsmen and auditing 
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 This is often analyzed in terms of a principal agent framework, where the principal (the public) delegates an 
instrument to accomplish certain goals to the agent (the politicians or policy makers). In the next step, the 
principal is the politician and the agent the civil servant in the bureaucracy (Batley, R. 2004; Adsèra 2003). 
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agencies which have been set up in many countries during recent years. These agencies are 
normally responsible for holding the government accountable in specific issue areas 
(Ackerman, 2004; 2005).  
Social accountability: Despite the implementation of many different measures to improve 
top-down accountability, corruption and other types of bad governance are persistent 
problems, not least in many developing countries
23
. Many analysts suggest that approaches to 
improve top-down accountability need to be complemented by bottom-up approaches to 
accountability that emphasise the demand side of good governance (Ackerman, 2005). Social 
accountability is a broad term for this type of demand side approaches to accountability. 
While Blair (2005, p. 128) refers to social accountability as “the accountability of the state to 
the society as a whole (as opposed to some individual sector of society)”, Malena, et al. 
(2004) defines it as “an approach towards building accountability that relies on civic 
engagement, i.e. in which it is ordinary citizens and/or civil society organizations who 
participate directly or indirectly in exacting accountability”. Social accountability 
mechanisms refer to the broad range of initiatives that citizens can use to hold the state 
accountable, including citizen monitoring of public services, participatory expenditure 
tracking, social auditing and civil society monitoring of the impacts of public policies
24
.  
Public participation and Voice: Some social accountability initiatives focus on enhancing 
public participation and giving voice to people to express views and interests and demand 
action of those in power. The focus is not on the creation of voice for its own sake but on 
enhancing the capacity to access information, scrutinize and demand answers in order to 
influence governance processes (O‟Neil et al., 2007). Voice can be exercised directly by poor 
people through for example elections but many times it is channeled through indirect 
mechanisms such as civil society organizations or media.  
This is clearly related to the opportunities and constraints discussed in the section about 
participation above. A general observation is that social accountability initiatives tend to be 
most effective if they are combined with accountability mechanisms “internal” to the state, 
i.e. are institutionalized and systematically implemented by a civil society, state or “hybrid” 
institution (Malena, 2004). This institutionalization is important to overcome the “event 
culture” that tends to prevail when concepts of societal participation and civic engagement 
are brought to the table (Eberlei, 2001 in Ackerman, 2005). It should also be noted that there 
is disagreement on how much and what kind of participation that is good for a democracy. 
For example Kaufman (2003, in Ackerman, 2004) argue that “...some forms of inclusion such 
as partnerships with NGOs may enhance capacity, other such as popular assemblies may be 
a step backward in terms of the efficiency, effectiveness and even the accountability of state 
organizations”. Ackerman (2004) on the other hand argues for the merits of full inclusion of 
the citizenry as a whole in the core activities of government. 
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 It should be noted that corruption is often linked to natural resources management (Veit et al, 2008; 
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ftp://ftp.worldbank.org/pub/asyed/socacc.htm 
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Rights to access to information and justice: In order for people to be able to exercise their 
voice and demand accountability from public authorities, legal rights pertaining to access to 
information, participation and justice are essential. For environmental matters these “Access 
rights” are stated as commitments in Principle 10 in the Rio Declaration as well as in the 
Aarhus convention which turns these commitments into legal obligations. Access to 
information can include the right to examine public records, obtain data from environmental 
monitoring or reports from environmental agencies. At a more general level access rights are 
rooted in civil and political human rights and part of international law on these issues. Using 
a human rights based approach, accountability can be expressed as relations between the 
public as having rights to access to information and justice and the state being the bearer of 
duty to fulfill these rights.  
Freedom of press: The degree of citizen information has been shown to be a significant factor 
in explaining the level of corrupt practices in different countries (Adsèra et al., 2003).  
 
7.2 SEA and Accountability 
Reinforcing social accountability as part of an SEA is put forward by the World Bank (2005) 
as a key mechanism for improved environmental governance. Ahmed and Sanchés-Triana 
(2008, p 192) note that in addition to the disclosure of information and public participation 
which are encouraged in traditional SEA methodologies, institution-centered SEA should in 
particular focus on strengthening the underlying legislation and implementation practices on 
information disclosure, public participation and access to justice on environmental matters. 
This is consistent with Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration and the 1998 Aarhus 
Convention
25
. Moreover, small steps in increasing accountability by putting in place 
institutions that create more transparency can be seen as levers for social learning that 
eventually create legitimacy for next steps in developing accountability. 
The focus on access rights is likely to be an important evolution in SEA approaches since 
these rights can become an important lever for public demands. The rapidly growing Access 
Initiative is one example of how a network of civil society organizations can utilize access 
rights for political mobilization
26
.  
While many governments have made progress in establishing legal frameworks for access 
rights the implementation of these frameworks is often weak (Foti et al., 2008). This 
highlights the need for I-SEA to focus on the mechanisms for enforcing access rights. As 
stated in the beginning of this chapter, subjecting power to the threat of sanctions through 
effective enforcement mechanisms is a crucial element of accountability.  At least parts of 
these enforcement mechanisms are likely to be found within the government system.  It can 
be questioned whether increased transparency and participation will lead to improved 
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 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, public participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice 
on Environmental Matters 
26
 www.accessinitiative.org  
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governance without a system of checks and balances and strengthening of competing 
agencies (or countervailing powers) which can challenge the interests dominating for 
example a sector (Fung, 2002; Galbraith, 1952). It should thus also be considered if I-SEA 
can analyze and strengthen “government internal” horizontal accountability systems. An 
analysis of horizontal (cross sector) and vertical mechanisms for coordination and sanctions 
as well as incentive systems within the public administration may very well be performed as 
part of an SEA.  
While the focus on access rights is clearly relevant, one could discuss whether an I-SEA 
could also strengthen other types of social accountability mechanisms. For instance it may be 
possible to institutionalize different types of participatory elements in the implementation of 
sector policies or management of natural resources. Although the form these institutions take 
will be highly context dependent, there seem to be a great need for further studies on how 
these types of arrangements can be influenced as part of an SEA. 
The importance of strengthening long term constituencies that can demand accountability 
and improved environmental governance is analyzed by Blair (2008) and recognized as 
important for I-SEA by Ahmed and Sánches-Triana (2008). Environmental Civil Society 
organizations, the media and the legislature are examples of actors that may form important 
parts of constituencies for environmental change.   
Finally, how to prioritize between and sequence different types of initiatives to improve 
accountability and environmental governance merits further attention. Is it preferable to 
begin by strengthening environmental constituencies and a system of competing interests and 
checks and balances that then can demand transparency and improved environmental 
governance? Or should the primary focus be on improving transparency which then allows 
environmental constituencies to get engaged? 
 
8. ENSURING SOCIAL LEARNING  
Strategic Environmental Assessments commonly involve both analytical and participatory 
approaches (OECD, 2006). In institutions centered SEA the role of learning is emphasized 
and this is an important feature distinguishing I-SEA from impact centered SEA approaches 
(Ahmed and Sánchez-Triana 2008, p 183). However understanding what type of learning 
takes place in a policy process is a complex endeavor.  First of all social learning is 
conceptually difficult since it is a very broad term that bring together several of the other key 
aspects of institution-centered SEA discussed in this literature review. Secondly, it is 
empirically difficult to evaluate if social learning has taken place and the effect it has had on 
specific policy outcomes (Bennett and Howlett, 1992). This section discusses how learning 
can be conceptualized in the context of SEA and how it may be evaluated. 
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8.1 Perspectives on Social Learning 
A learning approach to understanding policy changes generally claim that states (and public 
bureaucracies) can learn from experiences and modify present action on basis of the results 
of previous action. A learning approach should be viewed as a complementary rather than an 
alternative hypothesis to theories emphasizing the importance of power and conflict for 
policy change (Bennet and Howlett, 1992). While policy processes always take place in a 
context of power struggles and political conflicts, learning can be an important factor for 
change as well.  
Different types of learning: In the literature different types of learning that may take place 
in policy processes are identified (Ebrahim, 2008)
 27
:   
Technical learning involves a search for new policy instruments in the context of fixed 
policy objectives and change occurs without fundamental discussion of objectives or basic 
strategies.   
Conceptual learning involves a more fundamental redefinition of policy goals, problem 
definitions and strategies. In for example the energy sector conceptual learning can imply a 
redefinition of the policy goals from energy production to energy security and that this new 
policy goal is shared by key actors that may have opposing political interests (Nilsson, 2005). 
Such a redefinition of policy goals is often crucial for environmental improvements, since 
implementation of environmental policies often require the collaboration between different 
sectors (Fiorino, 2001).  
The distinction between technical and conceptual learning has connotations to the distinction 
between single loop learning and double loop learning in organizational theory (Argyris and 
Schön, 1996). Single loop learning is “concerned primarily with effectiveness: how best to 
achieve existing goals and objectives” while double loop learning involves “inquiry through 
which organizational values and norms themselves are modified” (Argyris and Schön 1996: 
22, as quoted by Ebrahim, 2008, p 160).  
Social learning builds on both technical and conceptual learning but focuses on interactions 
and communications among actors (Forino, 2001). With its emphasis on relations among 
actors and the quality of the dialogue, social learning is clearly linked to stakeholder 
participation in policy processes as well as accountability. The extent to which stakeholder 
participation and other types of social interactions result in learning is influenced by formal 
and informal institutional rules related to the policy process. Institutional rules shape power 
relations and determine how and where decisions are being made, who is in charge and who 
                                            
27
 This conceptualization follows Glasbergen‟s (1996) work on environmental policy in the Netherlands 
and is used by several analysts, including Fiorino 2001, page 324; Ebrahim, 2008, and Nilsson, 2006 (with 
some modifications). Other concepts in the “learning literature” include government learning, lessons 
drawing and political learning (Bennett and Howlett, 1992). 
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gets to participate. Thus changing institutional rules can affect the possibilities for learning to 
occur (Nilsson, 2006, p 4). 
In addition, the concept of political learning is used by some analysts to describe situations 
where new concepts are introduced and strategies improved but with the purpose of 
strengthening fixed policy positions and objectives. The use of the political learning concept 
“…allows for an often-neglected distinction to be made between strategic behavior and 
genuine shifts in beliefs” (Nilsson 2005, p 209).  
The role of research and evidence for learning and policy making: Research may be very 
influential on policy (recent examples include the bio-physical and economic research on 
climate change; see e.g. IPPC, 2007; Stern et al, 2006). However, as pointed out by e.g. 
Carden (2005), Owens (2005) and Neilson (2001), more information generated through 
research, policy assessments or evaluations does not automatically translate to improved 
decisions or learning. Factors such as incentives, timing, costs, capacity (to absorb or 
understand research knowledge) and public opinion can constrain transfer of knowledge to 
policy making. 
Tracing the influence of research knowledge on policy processes is associated with 
difficulties, partly due to the multitude of indirect links between research and policy 
processes, and time lags. It may be that policy processes internalize research knowledge 
years or decades after the original research was undertaken (Neilson, 2001). The research-
policy links are also obscured by the fact that most research is incremental and cumulative, 
and requires translation, interpretation and adaptation in the policy process. Disentangling 
research knowledge from other knowledge, information and opinion in the policy process is 
therefore an additional difficulty. Some go as far as claiming that there is a cultural gap 
between the academic and the political spheres (“communities”), which substantially inhibits 
policy uptake of research (Caplan, 1979). This view is somewhat moderated by Weiss (1977) 
who claim that we should not generally expect research to have a direct and immediate 
(linear) impact on policy. Rather, policy uptake of research knowledge is slow and 
incremental, and determined by organizations‟ (the political sphere‟s) openness towards new 
scientific knowledge. Research has an enlightenment function which slowly creeps into the 
policy sphere and gradually changes the mind set of politicians/policy makers. Research can 
suddenly change political priorities if other actions and events have worked in favor of taking 
the research knowledge on board.  
Time is thus an important factor to consider when discussing the role of research and 
assessments for learning and policy making. Although new evidence in many cases may have 
little impact on policy making in the short run, the impact in the long run may be greater.  
Learning in different types of policy processes: Among the factors that determine the 
scope for evidence and learning to play an important role in a policy process, Lindquist 
(2001) underlines the importance of the decision mode of the organizations or networks 
involved in the policy process. He distinguishes between routine, incremental and 
fundamental decision modes. Routine decision regimes focus mainly on matching and 
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adapting existing programs to emerging conditions, and are generally not receptive to 
research or analytical work suggesting major changes. Incremental decision-making 
processes deals with selective issues as they emerge and can be receptive to policy analysis 
that identifies alternatives that address selective issues that do not involve wholesale 
rethinking of existing policies. Fundamental decisions are relatively infrequent opportunities 
to re-think approaches to policy problems, for example as result of crisis or new 
governments. In anticipation of fundamental policy decisions, or following sharp regime 
shifts, a large openness and demand for research and new information can be expected. These 
fundamental decision regimes provide windows of opportunities for social learning as well as 
change in a broader perspective.  
The scope of learning in relation to knowledge base and degree of social conflict: Several 
analysts use a simple typology displayed in Table 1 to discuss how learning (Nilsson and 
Persson, 2003), the role of policy assessments (Kornov and Thissen, 2000) and 
implementation of policies (Matland, 1995) depend on the availability of substantive 
knowledge and the degree of social conflict in a decision making process.  
Table 1. Typology of problem situations with indicated support approach 
 
 
Low conflict of  
values/interests 
Strong conflict of 
values/interests 
Good knowledge base  
Low uncertainty/ambiguity 
Rational problem solving 
approach 
Technical learning 
Mediation 
Negotiation support 
 
Weak knowledge base  
High uncertainty/ambiguity 
Risk approach, 
Experimentation 
Additional research 
 
Catalytic and entrepreneurial 
approaches 
Source: adapted from Kornov and Thissen, 2000. 
In situations where a high degree of social consensus is combined with a good knowledge 
base, rational problem solving based on facts and technical (rather than conceptual) learning 
is more likely to occur. When a high degree of social consensus is combined with a weak 
knowledge base additional research can play an important role. Experimentation and learning 
during the implementation of decisions becomes important due to ambiguity involved at the 
decision stage. Ambiguity “provides an opportunity to learn new methods, technologies, and 
goals” (Matland, 1995). In situations where there are strong social conflicts the prospects for 
learning are bleaker, especially if this is combined with a weak knowledge base. Political 
learning rather than genuine shifts in beliefs are more likely since actors tend to have clearly 
defined and incompatible goals and are less willing to interact. More analytical inputs are 
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unlikely to result in improved decisions since actors act strategically and power rather than 
learning govern the outcome of decision making in these situations (Matland, 1995). 
Approaches focusing on stimulating interaction, dialogue and negotiation between different 
interests may be more fruitful feeding more new information to the stakeholders (Nilsson and 
Persson, 2003; Kornov and Thissen, 2000).  
This basic and rather crude typology may involve a risk of oversimplification, but the point is 
to illustrate that the level of knowledge and degree of social conflict matters greatly not only 
for the opportunities for learning to occur but also for how to design an appropriate SEA 
approach (Kornov and Thissen, 2000). 
Institutions for learning: Different institutions may be more or less conducive for social 
learning processes to take place. Formal and informal rules for how and where decisions are 
made and who gets to participate are important determinants for learning outcomes. For 
example many central governments can be characterized as being based on a bargaining 
model where each ministry is looking out for its core interests in an interdepartmental 
negotiation process. Instead of being conducive to learning this institutional set up often lead 
to positional wars and strategic use of knowledge. Parliamentary committees, or cross sector 
working groups created around certain themes are examples of institutions that have been 
more conducive for learning (Nilsson, 2005; Pillai, 2008).  
Organizational research has shown that the ability of organizations to learn and incorporate 
new understandings is often limited. Organizations tend to accept knowledge that confirms 
their world views and resist such knowledge that challenges them (Nilsson, 2006). March 
(1991) claim that organizations face a trade-off between “the exploration of new possibilities 
and the exploitation of old certainties”. The essence of explorations is experimentation with 
new alternatives and the resulting returns from this learning endeavor are often long term. 
Since the essence of exploitation is on the refinement and extension of existing competences, 
technologies and ideas whose pay offs are more immediate, there are strong incentives for 
organizations to favor exploitation over exploration (March, 1991). Given these incentives 
that restrain learning it is often held that a force from outside is necessary in order to induce 
learning (Sabatier and Weible, 2007 and Nilsson, 2006). Such a force from outside is often 
viewed in terms of external shocks leading to changes in power relations among influential 
actors or networks (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). 
Network theory states that learning occurs when actors with different interests and beliefs 
interact in the policy arena. The literature does however not give any clear guidance on how 
to design institutions that create the type of interactions that result in social learning. For 
example Nooteboom (2007) claims that EIA, as an example of a formal institution, has 
contributed to a learning process with far reaching effects in The Netherlands. The effects on 
learning of institutionalizing mandatory participation systems, requiring governments to 
involve civil society, in the development of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers are mixed. In 
some countries like Honduras it has given NGOs a more important role and contributed to 
political openness (Seppanen, 2005). But in many other countries this mandated participation 
did not seem to deliver a lot of visible result (IEO, 2004; OED, 2004). For example, in 
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Bolivia it resulted in a larger gap between expectations and results, frustrating the poor 
population (Dijkstra, 2005). 
 
8.2 SEA and Social Learning 
Social learning is important in the World Bank I-SEA approach since it is seen as a key 
mechanism to assure that I-SEA can have an influence beyond the discrete policy 
intervention. The World Bank (2005, p 56) suggests that “improving policy learning – 
technical, conceptual and social - relies on enhancing communication and dialogue among 
actors and constant evaluation”. While “systems for monitoring and evaluation that are 
publicly available are crucial not only for technical learning but also for democratic 
legitimacy and public confidence” promoting social learning in environmental policy is more 
about “creating a culture of stakeholder involvement and scrutiny among policy makers and 
implementers”. Ahmed and Sanchez-Triana (2008, p 193) suggest that in order to promote 
social learning an I-SEA should focus on aspects such as: 
 “Politicizing” environmental issues, by linking them to broader development issues and 
integrating agendas of environmental ministries with those of more influential ministries 
 Strengthening policy advocacy networks and creating public forums for policy debate to 
ensure that diverse perspectives are repeatedly placed on policy makers‟ agendas 
 Putting effective transparency mechanisms in place and supporting media scrutiny of 
policy and implementation to strengthen accountability. 
The suggested aspects an I-SEA should focus on in order to promote social learning illustrate 
that social learning is viewed as an outcome resulting from the implementation of many 
different activities. The World Bank approach to social learning seems to be well grounded 
in modern theories of adaptive management, collaborative planning and interactive policy 
making (See for example Feldman and Khademian, 2008; Healey 1997; and Innes and 
Booher, 1999). There is no single best way to stimulate social learning, and it is extremely 
sensitive to context. It may be more an art than a science, and I-SEA should primarily 
consider what is feasible given the specific context.  
An interesting development of the framework would be an explicit discussion of how I-SEA 
best can contribute to social learning in different types of decision making contexts (in line 
with the discussion above (Kornov and Thissen, 2000; Lindqvist, 2001). It would be 
interesting if the evaluation of the I-SEA pilots could explore if there may be a tradeoff 
between making an SEA process as open as possible on the one hand and maximizing 
learning on the other. Do stakeholders need an environment that is not completely open to 
media and public scrutiny for being willing to challenge old positions? 
The broad nature of the social learning concept may be the main weakness of this part of the 
I-SEA approach. The broad concepts used related to learning and the slow nature of learning 
processes are likely to make it difficult to empirically evaluate if learning has taken place and 
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to attribute possible changes to I-SEA. Aware of this, the World Bank (2005) suggests that 
the effects of learning should be studied over long time frames and that one should have 
conservative expectations about the potential for actual learning (World Bank, 2005). But 
even so, as Bennet and Howlett (1992) note, “it may be impossible to observe the learning 
activity in isolation from the change requiring explanation” and that “we may only know that 
learning is taking place because policy change is taking place”. In relation to SEA it seems 
important to distinguish the learning activities more clearly from the objective of integrating 
key environmental concerns into policy formation. As a starting point it would be desirable 
to further disentangle the concepts related to policy learning and I-SEA and clarify (Bennet 
and Howlett, 1992; Nilsson, 2006):  
 Who learns? is it primarily government officials and policy makers or a broader set of 
societal actors?;  
 What is learnt? is it mainly technical learning or are more fundamental problems and 
strategies re-conceptualized?;  
 What are the key elements of learning? is it mainly new knowledge acquisition, lessons 
drawing or institutionalization?;  
 What are the results of learning? what effect does learning have on policy outcomes? 
Finally, social learning is something that the social actors should do themselves, if they want. 
Interventions cannot force any actor to learn. As the saying goes, “one can bring a camel to a 
well, but one cannot force him to drink”. Instruments that create accountability may increase 
a sense of interdependency, but the actors may still refrain from agreeing on joint interests. 
Therefore, progress on social learning should in the first place be observable as changes in 
the attitude of individuals toward others who ask attention for the environment. 
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C. EVALUATING I-SEA 
9. FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING I-SEA PILOTS 
This section provides guidance for the evaluation of the different I-SEAs in the World Bank 
Pilot Program. For each Pilot to be evaluated there will be separate Terms of References 
developed containing more detailed information and guidance.  
The evaluation framework
28
 aims at: i) forming a shared understanding of the objectives, 
concepts and methodologies used in Institution-centered SEA; ii) establishing joint objectives 
and a common scope for the pilot evaluations; iii) facilitating the cross analysis of the results 
of the different pilot evaluations. Although these are some general objectives to attain, the 
evaluators should be flexible in applying this framework adjusting the evaluations to the 
unique contextual factors that set the stage for each pilot that will be evaluated.  
 
9.1 Evaluation Objectives 
The general objective of evaluating the SEA Pilots is to learn how effective the I-SEA 
approach is to integrate environmental and social considerations in policies, plans and 
programs, and understand the contextual factors that explain its influence or lack thereof. 
The specific objectives of the evaluation of an I-SEA pilot are the following: 
(i) To evaluate the pilot‟s actual and potential influence on a concrete policy, plan or 
program and on the underlying institutional framework in which this policy, plan or 
program has been formulated and implemented. 
(ii) To evaluate how and to what extent contextual influencing factors and processes 
explain the influence or lack of influence of the Pilot.  
(iii) To evaluate how the pilot used the I-SEA methodological framework while adapting 
to contextual influencing factors and processes. 
(iv) To evaluate to what extent the Pilot has achieved the process outcomes of I-SEA. 
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 The evaluation framework presented in this section builds partly on the section on evaluation in the OECD 
DAC SEA Guidance (OECD, 2006, p. 123-128). It contains however less of  “SEA quality control check-
elements” which is one of the two part evaluation checklist presented by the OECD DAC or benchmarks for 
good practice as can be found in a recent proposal of a Generic SEA Quality Review Methodology (Sadler, B. 
and Dalal-Clayton, B., 2009). 
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9.2 Evaluation Considerations 
The evaluation of the I-SEA pilots involves several challenges. The evaluators should 
especially consider the following issues
29
:  
Evaluating outcomes rather than impact: Since the evaluations will take place shortly 
after the completion of the different I-SEA Pilots, the more long term impacts
30
 on the 
underlying institutional framework and political economy context will not be evaluated. A 
more tangible scope for the evaluation than to evaluate impacts is therefore to assess the 
outcomes of the I-SEA Pilots. Outcomes can be defined as changes in the behaviour, 
relationships, activities or actions of people, groups, organizations and institutions with 
which the I-SEA Pilot has engaged with (Earl et al 2001)
31
. The evaluation should thus focus 
on detecting the many different types of expected and unexpected outcomes (or changes) that 
may have evolved in the limited time frame since the initiation of the SEA Pilot. The I-SEA 
model as outlined in this report suggests that important expected outcomes would be raised 
attention to environmental priorities, strengthened environmental constituencies, enhanced 
social accountability and greater capacity for social learning. For some pilots it may also be 
possible to find that key environmental issues have been incorporated in policy formulation 
and implementation. More examples of what expected outcomes can be and suggestions on 
how these can be detected are found in the evaluation questions below.  
The key challenge of not having access to a baseline or counterfactual when mapping these 
kinds of outcomes would be at least partially addressed by building a sound narrative on how 
the I-SEA pilot intended to incorporate environmental and social considerations in specific 
interventions, what actually happened and discussing why this may have happened (See 
Evaluation Report in subsection 9.3 below). The evaluator may as well consider other 
experience in the sector for influencing decision making and institutional strengthening in an 
attempt to anticipate conclusions on “what may happen” in the future as a result of the I-SEA 
being evaluated. There is a wealth of experience on capacity building and influencing 
strategic decision making that can be brought to bear at least to point out potential strengths 
or weaknesses of the pilot I-SEA being evaluated.      
Analysing the contribution of I-SEA to outcomes rather than establishing causality:  A 
second challenge in evaluating the influence of the I-SEA pilots concerns the difficulty to 
determine if observed changes are caused by the I-SEA or by other factors. Changes are 
likely the result of many contributing factors and an I-SEA can at best be one of these. Rather 
than attempting to establish a direct causality between the I-SEA and the observed outcomes 
the evaluation should analyse if it is likely that the I-SEA Pilot has made an important 
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 More elaborate information on these and other challenges in evaluating complex change processes can be 
found in e.g. Weiss, 1998; and Yin, 1994.  
30
 Impacts refers to the effects of a development intervention on local social, economic, environmental and other 
development indicators (OECD DAC, 2008) 
31
 This definition of Outcomes comes from IDRC‟s and others‟ work on Outcome Mapping as an evaluation 
methodology.  The term Institutions has been added for the purpose of this evaluation, but is not included in the 
definition of outcomes suggested by Earl et al (2001). Earl et al uses the term Boundary Partners for the 
individuals, groups and organizations with whom a program interacts directly.  
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contribution to these outcomes. The evaluation may trace logical links between I-SEA 
activities and outcomes, but should be careful in not framing this in terms of causality.   
Analysing the interaction between contextual factors and I-SEA in explaining 
outcomes: A critical success factor for SEA-effectiveness is the ability to adjust the scope 
and methodology of an SEA to contextual factors (e.g. Hilding-Rydevik and Bjarnadóttir, 
2007). The interaction between the pilot and its context should therefore merit attention when 
evaluating the contribution of an I-SEA Pilot to observable outcomes. The evaluator should 
distinguish between factors under control of the SEA team and external factors. Formal as 
well as informal institutions in the country
32
, windows of opportunity for policy reform, and 
political economy conditions affecting the implementation viability of reforms, are examples 
of external factors that could define favourably or unfavourably I-SEA outcomes. It is 
difficult to identify ex-ante which contextual factors are most important in explaining I-SEA 
outcomes. As a rule of thumb the evaluator should intend, early in the evaluation process, to 
get a broad overview of the historical, political, economic, social, cultural and institutional 
factors that may be crucial to the policy intervention at hand. The evaluator should then try to 
narrow the focus to those contextual factors that seem to be most important in explaining the 
influence or lack of influence of the I-SEA pilot.  
In evaluating the interaction between the pilot and its context, the evaluator should also 
analyze the role of the factors potentially under control of the SEA team. Among them merit 
consideration the ability to access and involve key stakeholders and decision makers in the I-
SEA process, communication of I-SEA findings and results, and the ability to take advantage 
of windows of opportunity for influencing decision making and effecting institutional 
change.    
 
9.3 Evaluation Process  
Evaluation Team: The evaluation of pilots will be carried out by specialists independent of 
the World Bank
33
. Evaluators are encouraged to team up with local expertise or seek 
assistance from local specialists to undertake the evaluation of the I-SEA pilots.  
Evaluation Steps: The evaluation of each pilot will involve the following steps: 
Preparatory work: Thorough preparations will be key for successful field work. Preparatory 
activities suggested include (i) document review, (ii) development of a plan for the field 
work including an interview guide, and (iii) draft context analysis. 
Field work: Each pilot evaluation would include at least one trip for carrying out fieldwork 
activities.  
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 See discussion in section 6.1 on the importance of informal institutions for the actual performance of formal 
institutions.  
33
 EEU and NCEA will each evaluate two pilots and the Swedish EIA Centre will evaluate one pilot. The 
remainder pilots will be commissioned by the World Bank to individual consultants with expertise in 
policy/institutional analysis, case study research strategy and, preferable, experience in SEA.   
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Report writing:  A draft evaluation report may be written during the field trip. This may 
allow for a validation of some of the findings already during the field trip. The final report 
should incorporate comments received on the draft report.  
Documentation of findings: Each evaluation team should establish an electronic database 
including documents, interview protocols and other sources of information on which the 
findings of the evaluation report are based. The database is one way of strengthening the 
reliability of the different evaluations. 
Evaluation Materials: The evaluation will build on the following material: 
Documents: The evaluators will have access to the documentation of the pilots including 
concept notes, ToRs, inception reports, mid-term reports, final reports and lessons learnt 
reports. In addition, the evaluators are expected to collect additional documentation 
necessary for fulfilling the objectives of the evaluation. 
Interviews: Three sets of actors should be interviewed in order to base the evaluation on 
different points of view and multiple sources of evidence:  
(i) The I-SEA team: From the I-SEA team the evaluators are expected to interview (i) the task 
manager of the project to which the pilot was associated; (ii) World Bank staff that actively 
participated in the implementation of the pilot; and (iii) the main consultant(s) in charge of 
the implementation of the SEA.  The World Bank would provide the evaluators with names 
and contact addresses of these interviewees. 
(ii) Policy makers and implementers: For the group of policy makers and implementers, the 
evaluators would interview government officials involved in the implementation of the 
policy and the use of the SEA recommendations at the strategic decision level like Ministers, 
Directors, Principal Secretaries, policy advisors, policy think tanks, etc. 
(iii) Key stakeholders: The evaluators will prepare a list of potential interviewees based on 
the stakeholder analysis of the I-SEA. This list should include but not be limited to 
representatives of civil society stakeholders, grassroots organizations, lobbyists, local 
communities, relevant sector organizations such as professional organizations and the private 
sector significantly affected directly or indirectly by the intervention assessed through the I-
SEA. By using and describing (in the evaluation report) broad-based soliciting, the list 
should strive at attaining representativeness of key stakeholders and appropriate 
consideration of multiple visions and perspectives. The interviewee list would be cleared by 
the World Bank prior to fieldwork.     
Evaluation Report: The evaluators will prepare the evaluation report as a narrative 
comprising four parts.  
(i) The first part (actual and potential influence of I-SEA) will discuss the discrete 
intervention (policy, plan or program) and the extent to which the I-SEA pilot has 
contributed to integrating environmental and social considerations into this intervention 
through: 
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- influencing decision makers and constituencies with a stake in the policy, plan or 
program formation in the sector, country or region; 
- influencing country work supported by the World Bank (i.e, preparation of loans), 
and, more broadly, World Bank staff working across the region or the world on 
similar sectoral interventions (i.e. mining reform, forest reform, urban planning, etc.) 
This analysis should identify policy and institutional changes that may have already 
taken place and processes that may lead to future policy and institutional changes.  
(ii) The second part (context and application of I-SEA) will contain a discussion of the 
context in which the I-SEA was undertaken, including historical, political, economic, 
social, cultural and institutional factors that may explain the influence or lack of 
influence of the I-SEA pilot. The evaluator should then discuss how I-SEA methods and 
tools were applied in undertaking the pilot, given the constraints and opportunities of the 
context.  
(iii) The third part (achievement of I-SEA process outcomes) will discuss the extent to 
which the I-SEA process was able to raise attention with respect to environmental and 
social priorities associated with the discrete intervention, strengthen constituencies and 
improve social accountability and social learning.  
(iv) In the fourth part (I-SEA effectiveness and analysis of strengths and limitations) the 
evaluator should draw conclusions and recommendations for effective I-SEA discussing 
the strengths and limitations of the I-SEA pilot evaluated. The discussion should include 
an analysis of the interaction between the I-SEA process and its historical, political, 
economic, social, cultural and institutional context.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
In addition, the evaluation report should contain information about how the evaluation was 
conducted and how the findings are substantiated. This “approach” section of the evaluation 
report should make a clear distinction between findings that are derived directly from 
document reviews or interviews, and the expert opinions of the evaluation team. Detailed 
information on the sources of information for the evaluation should be provided in 
appendices to the main evaluation report. 
 9.4 Evaluation Questions/Evaluation Criteria 
This section outlines a set of evaluation questions which are intended to guide the evaluation 
teams in fulfilling the evaluation objectives. The questions are posed to the evaluators and 
should not be interpreted as interview questions that should be posed to different 
respondents. In order to assist the evaluators in answering the general evaluation questions, 
detailed evaluation questions are specified. The detailed evaluation questions can also be 
seen as interim markers of progress
34
 in relation to the influence of the SEA pilot (evaluation 
question 1) and the achievement of envisaged process outcomes of the SEA pilots 
(evaluation question 3). 
                                            
34
 Weiss, C.H. (1998), page 127-129. 
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GENERAL QUESTIONS FOR THE EVALUATION OF I-SEA PILOTS 
1. How and why has the I-SEA pilot influenced decision making processes? 
- In relation to policy, plan or program formation in the sector, country or region? 
- In relation to country work supported by the World Bank? 
- In relation to other actors and processes? 
- What are the factors that may explain the pilot‟s influence or lack thereof? 
- Which trends or processes may favor or hinder the influence of the I-SEA pilot in the 
future? 
2. How was the pilot undertaken given the context? 
- How were key contextual factors identified and taken into account? 
- How were analytical and participatory tools and methods used? 
- How were stakeholders‟ vulnerability aspects considered? 
- Appropriateness, strengths and weaknesses of tools and methods used? 
3. To what extent did the pilot achieve key I-SEA process outcomes? How and why?  
Intended outcomes: 
- Raised attention to environmental and social priorities for policy reform, plans and 
programs 
- Strengthened constituencies  
- Improved social accountability  
- Enhanced social learning 
Other outcomes of the I-SEA pilot? 
4. What were the strengths and weaknesses of the I-SEA pilot for influencing decision 
making processes?  
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DETAILED QUESTIONS FOR THE EVALUATION OF I-SEA PILOTS  
1. How and why has the I-SEA pilot influenced decision making processes?  
A. In relation to policy, plan or program formation in the sector, country or region? 
- Increased integration of environmental and social priority issues?  
- Specific policy decisions including, if relevant, the preparation of laws, executive 
power or judiciary decisions and regulations? 
B. In relation to country work supported by the World Bank? 
- The preparation of a World Bank project or loan to support a client country‟s 
policy, plan or program?  
- The dialogue between the client country and the Bank? 
- Other processes and actors within the World Bank such as staff working across the 
region or the world on similar sectoral interventions? 
 
C. In relation to other actors and processes? 
- Other expected or unexpected changes in the behaviour, relationships or actions 
of people, groups, organizations and institutions with which the I-SEA Pilot has 
engaged with? 
D. What are the factors that may explain the pilot’s influence or lack thereof? 
E. Which trends or processes may favor or hinder the influence of the I-SEA pilot in the 
future? 
- How has the I-SEA pilot attempted to assure that its influence reaches beyond the 
discrete policy intervention? 
2. How was the I-SEA pilot undertaken given the context? 
A. How were key contextual factors identified and taken into account? 
- Historical, political, economic, social, cultural and institutional factors 
(formal/informal) critical for the decision making process?  
- Political economy factors affecting the viability of the proposed intervention? 
- Seizing windows of opportunity for influencing the decision making process 
related to the discrete intervention or dealing with the effects of the closing of 
these windows of opportunity? 
 
B. How were  analytical and participatory tools and methods used for: 
- Stakeholder dialogue 
- Identifying and selecting environmental and social priorities? 
- Institutional and political economy analysis?  
- The validation of pilot recommendations and dissemination?  
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C. How were stakeholders’ vulnerability aspects such as gender discrimination, youth 
unemployment, weak land titling/property rights of farmers, etc, considered?  
D. Appropriateness, strengths and weaknesses of tools and methods used? 
3. To what extent did the pilot achieve intended I-SEA process outcomes? How and why? 
A. Raised attention to environmental (and social) priorities 
- Are priorities more clearly defined? How is this documented? 
- Have environmental priorities been “politicized” and linked to growth, poverty 
reduction or other key development issues? 
- To what extent are priorities shared among key stakeholders? 
- How has the Pilot contributed to raise attention to priorities? 
 
B. Strengthened constituencies 
- Which constituencies have been strengthened (CSO CBO, Private sector, 
networks within the bureaucracy, networks involving many different kinds of 
actors)? 
- Have stakeholder engagement and networks been maintained after completion of 
the I-SEA report?  
C. Improved social accountability 
-  New or improved legislation on access to information, public participation or 
justice on environmental matters?  
- Strengthened institutional mechanisms for the implementation/enforcement of 
legislation on access rights?  
- Mechanisms for stakeholder participation or involvement in strategic decision 
making, particularly weak and vulnerable stakeholders? 
- Enhanced transparency and media scrutiny of policy decision making? 
- Other accountability mechanisms that have been strengthened through the I-SEA 
pilot?  
D. Enhanced social learning 
- Who has learned? Is it primarily government officials and policy makers or a 
broader set of societal actors? 
- In the Bank, is it just at the level of an individual task team leader (TTL) or 
broader among sectoral TTLs that learning has occurred?  
- What has been learnt? Is it mainly technical learning or have more fundamental 
problems and strategies been re-conceptualized? 
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- Has the I-SEA pilot initiated or strengthened mechanisms for: 
 inter sector or multi sector coordination?  
 dialogue on policy reform that includes environmental and social 
perspective and involves multiple stakeholders? 
 compensating potential losers of policy changes? 
 monitoring and evaluation creating feedback for policy and planning fine-
tuning? 
 linking policy making with research communities? 
 
E. What other outcomes did the I-SEA pilot lead to?  
 
4. What were the strengths and weaknesses of the I-SEA pilot for influencing decision 
making processes?  
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